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This thesis analyzes the factors that influence the decision of first-term Naval 
Veterans (NAVETs), who are eligible for reenlistment, to choose to affiliate with the 
Selected Reserve (SELRES).  Multivariate logit models of the determinants of affiliation 
are specified and estimated using data on active Navy separations and Navy Reserve 
accessions during the period between 1990 and 2002.  A data set was provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center that permitted analysis of the affiliation decisions of 
388,637 NAVETs. Some of the features in the maximum likelihood logit models include 
the use of rating groups to determine differences in affiliation patterns by occupational 
categories, determining differences over various time periods, and looking at pay and 
unemployment rate elasticities across rating groups.  Overall, NAVET affiliation in the 
SELRES is found to depend upon Reserve pay, unemployment rates, Census region, 
gender, race, marital status, dependents, age at time of separation from active duty, 
education, mental category, and Navy rating.  More specifically, the findings indicate that 
technical ratings are more responsive to changes in pay than non-technical ratings and 
that affiliation increases with increases in the local area unemployment rate.  Various 
time periods were analyzed to determine if the drawdown years of the early 1990s 
differed from the rest of the sample, and to determine if differences existed during and 
after the 'dot.com' boom of the late 1990s.  In both cases, the results indicate that the 
impact of various determinants differed significantly across these different years.   
Females, Blacks and Hispanics were more likely to affiliate, while those NAVETs who 
are married, have children, and are older are less likely to affiliate.  Finally, there was a 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the nation's reservists have been 
called into service at rates not seen in two generations.  Although the Army Reserve is 
currently bearing the brunt of the burden in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Naval Reserve 
has been used extensively as well, particularly in the medical and force protection fields.  
These two fields and other specific occupational fields require personnel who are 
properly trained and qualified in their unique skill set and thus ready for mobilization on 
short notice.  Time is no longer on the side of the reserves, thus mobilizing untrained and 
unqualified individuals and submitting them to lengthy training programs prior to 
deployment is no longer a realistic option.   
The Title 10 (of the United Sates Code) requirement that a reservist with no prior 
service must complete what amounts to almost three years of service in a reserve unit 
prior to their being eligible for mobilization depletes the actual number of reservists 
available for mobilization.  As a result, it is imperative that the Naval Reserve recruit into 
its ranks Naval Veterans (NAVETs) who bring with them the skills in demand in the 
Selected Reserves (SELRES).  To do this, the recruiters must be aware of what attracts 
NAVETs to the Selected Reserve.  Knowledge of demographics, regional differences, 
rating differences and pay differences may be attributes that will allow recruiters to focus 
their efforts and resources on a certain type of NAVET in the hope of strengthening the 
overall reserve force.   
A. BACKGROUND  
In 1986 the Reagan administration was in the midst of finalizing plans for the 
600-ship Navy.  This planned increase in hardware brought with it the requirement for an 
increase in manpower that was greater than the active duty Navy could handle.  As a 
result, pressure was exerted on the SELRES to have a sizable, quality force.  The best 
way to both increase the SELRES numbers and ensure it was of high quality was to 
recruit those individuals separating from active duty. 
At this point in time NAVETs constituted the majority of the SELRES force.  
This pleased the Navy Reserve because it filled their ranks with trained and qualified 
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sailors, enabling the SELRES to quickly fill any requirements the active force was unable 
to handle.  However, as the SELRES began to take on more unique roles for the active 
duty Navy it became increasingly important to focus recruiting efforts on those NAVETs 
that held specific skills.  The challenge that confronted the SELRES was the continuous 
recruitment of these skilled individuals. 
As the 1980s closed, the 1990s brought a reduction in the active Navy.  Two 
consequences of the drawdown affected the SELRES.  First, as the active force decreased 
in size, the pool of eligible sailors separating from the Navy decreased as well.  With 
fewer separations came fewer potential NAVET affiliates.  Secondly, the SELRES was 
also decreasing in size and as a result they were more selective as to what skill sets they 
required and accepted.  These two issues resulted in the beginning of a shift away from 
NAVETs and toward non-prior service (NPS) personnel to fill resulting gaps in the 
SELRES.  As the 1990s closed, the need for NPS sailors continued to increase, but the 
desire for qualified NAVETs remained.  
 A further problem that hampered the SELRES' ability to recruit NAVETs was the 
separation between the active and reserve recruiting commands, and the reserve's 
limitation on whom they could recruit.  A particular problem arose from the fact that 
reserve recruiters could not recruit NPS personnel under age 26, leaving the 18-26 year 
old population to the active duty recruiters.  Until 2003, two separate recruiting 
commands existed within the Navy: Commander Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), 
and Commander Naval Reserve Recruiting Command.  Under this organization, each 
command worked separately to recruit qualified applicants and each developed separate 
plans and models on recruitment.  Unfortunately, reserve recruitment of NAVETs was 
based primarily on the separation of active duty sailors, and thus was difficult to predict 
due to the varied reasons for active duty separation, the geographic location decisions of 
veterans, and their occupational skills and training.    
Under the new naval recruiting organization, reserve recruiting falls under the 
cognizance of CNRC.  As a result, CNRC would like to model reserve recruiting more 
like active recruiting in an effort to better direct resources to meet recruiting goals and 
increase affiliation of NAVETs into the SELRES.  The need for NAVETs has taken on 
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increasing importance recently as a significant change has occurred within the make up 
of the SELRES force over the past five to ten years.  During this timeframe the 
percentage of NAVETs affiliating with the SELRES has continued to decrease and the 
percentage of NPS personnel has increased.  From 2000 to 2003 alone, the percentage of 
NPS recruits affiliating with the SELRES doubled; from 20 percent of total recruits in 
2000 to nearly 42 percent of total recruits in 2003 (Hobson p. 8).  Couple the increased 
dependence on NPS personnel with the downsizing of both the active and reserve force, 
and the result is a reserve force that will continue to become less experienced and less 
prepared for deployment. 
In an effort to increase the number of NAVETs in the SELRES, the reserve force 
must first understand the factors that entice first-term NAVETs to affiliate with the 
SELRES upon completion of their active duty enlistment.  In 1987 the Center for Naval 
Analysis published research by Martha Shiells designed to determine what factors 
influenced NAVETs to affiliate with the Selected Reserve.  Her study was based upon 
data from 1979 through 1984.  Since the publication of Shiells' study numerous things 
have changed that may affect affiliation rates: the end of the Cold War; the Gulf War of 
1990-1991; the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001; and the subsequent Global War 
on Terrorism, including prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  These events have 
involved the use of reserves in numbers not seen since Korea and Vietnam.  More 
importantly, from a readiness standpoint, because of the increase in NPS personnel the 
reserves that have been mobilized to meet these demands have less experience then ever 
before.  Since Shiells' study no further research has been conducted to determine if the 
factors affecting affiliation into the Naval Reserve may have changed.  
Finally, the economics of the 21st century differ from those at the end of the 
1970s and early 1980s when the United States was coming out of a recession.  That being 
said, is it possible that the reasons for SELRES affiliation have changed over the past two 
decades?  More importantly, the elasticities of pay, bonuses and other factors estimated 
by Shiells may no longer adequately describe affiliation behavior.  If this is the case then 
CNRC could benefit from a new analysis of reserve recruiting, especially the recruitment 
of NAVETs.  Also, manpower planners can use the new pay, bonus, recruiter and other 
elasticities to help choose among alternative recruitment polices.  
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B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis intends to examine the factors that affect affiliation rates of first-term 
NAVETs in the Selected Reserve.  First-term veterans (individuals who successfully 
completed their first term of enlistment in the active Navy and are eligible for 
reenlistment upon separation) who separated from the Navy during the period 1990 to 
2002 will be analyzed to determine those who affiliated with the SELRES within one 
year of their active duty separation date.  The individuals who affiliated with the 
SELRES will be analyzed to determine if there are any trends that may indicate a 
preference for the Selected Reserve. A review will be conducted of literature on the 
theory of the decision to work, especially the decision to work a second job, and the 
implications for Selected Reserve affiliation.    
The prediction model will include factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, rating, 
wages/pay, marital status, education levels and region.  This thesis intends to use a 
maximum likelihood logit model to predict the probability of affiliation, conditional on 
the selected independent variables.  It is hoped that the model will be able to help predict 
affiliation rates for individuals in the SELRES, but more importantly will be able to 
determine the factors most influential in determining NAVET affiliation with the 
Selected Reserve.  The estimated elasticities from this work will be compared to those 
estimated by Shiells' to determine whether behavior has changed in the last 20 years.   
This thesis intends two answer to questions.  The primary question is whether pay 
and other important factors have the same effects (elasticities) on reserve affiliation as in 
the early 1980s.  The secondary question addresses the hypothesis that Selected Reserve 
affiliation decisions differ significantly across regions and ratings. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contains five chapters.  Chapter I provides an introduction and general 
background information on the area of analysis.  Chapter II conducts a literature review 
relating to Selected Reserve affiliation and the economic theory of the decision to work a 
second job.  Chapter III describes model specification and methodology as well as the 
data used in the study.  Chapter IV contains the results of the analysis based upon the 
models developed.  Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations based upon 
the findings of the study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. STUDY BY MARTHA SHIELLS, (1986) 
1. History 
In 1986 the Reagan administration was in the midst of finalizing plans for the 
600-ship Navy.  This planned increase in hardware brought with it the requirement for an 
increase in manpower, and this increase was greater than the active duty Navy could 
handle on it's own.  As a result, pressure was exerted on the Naval Reserve to have a 
sizable, quality force.  The best way to both increase the Naval Reserve and ensure it was 
of high quality was to recruit individuals coming off of active duty.   The Research 
Memorandum written by Martha E. Shiells in December 1986 for the Center for Naval 
Analyses entitled Affiliation of Navy Veterans with the Selected Reserve looked at this 
issue to determine what factors influenced the decision of first time enlisted Navy 
veterans to join the SELRES.  She focused on the effect of affiliation bonuses.   
When this research was conducted NAVETs constituted the bulk of the Naval 
Reserve force.  This was a positive attribute from the Naval Reserve's point of view 
because they tended to get more qualified personnel; however, as the reserve force began 
to take on more unique roles for the active duty Navy, it became increasingly important 
to focus recruiting efforts on those NAVETs that held specific skills.  In order to 
determine the best way to recruit these individuals Shiells concentrated on NAVETs 
pay/compensation, rating, paygrade, age, race and sex.  In addition, to help capture some 
of the potential effects of the current economic environment she included the geographic 
home of record of the NAVET and the unemployment rate in the state where the 
geographic home was located. 
Her model was developed to better predict what type of NAVET is most likely to 
affiliate with the SELRES, and from this the reserves could better target recruiting 
efforts, to include affiliation bonuses, that would bring in the NAVETs who met the new 
requirements of the active Navy. 
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2. Theory 
The theory of the decision to work states that individuals make labor supply 
decisions that maximize their utility level, and that this decision is based upon three 
things; the opportunity cost of leisure, the individual's level of wealth, and the 
individual's preferences (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2003).  When a NAVET leaves the Navy 
and joins the workforce, they are substituting their Navy base pay for the base pay 
received at the job they acquire in the civilian sector.  Assuming that they desire the same 
level of leisure during this transition, we can also assume that the civilian income must 
match that of the Navy.  We can further assume that there is no increase in wealth 
associated with this move to the civilian sector.  If the civilian job does not meet the 
individual's utility level, they will need to increase their income through increased work.  
There are two means available to the NAVETs in this study to increase their income: 
first, they can work a part-time job above and beyond their regular job; or, second, they 
could join the SELRES.  In this case the SELRES is a part-time job, which would 
substitute for a civilian part-time job. 
During Shiells' study, these two alternatives were taken into account when 
determining whether a NAVET would join the SELRES.  In addition, because the 
economic climate is believed to effect an individual's decision, the unemployment level 
of the state the NAVET lists as their home of record was used as a prediction of 
affiliation.  Finally, because an increase in an individual's income level shifts their budget 
constraint outward the study looks at the impact an affiliation bonus would have on 
recruiting NAVETs.  From theory it would be expected that the bonus would cause an 
income effect, shifting the NAVETs budget constraint and thus their utility curve to the 
northeast and result in decreased work hours.  However, a substitution effect would exist 
as well such that the same level of work, regular job plus the part-time SELRES job, 
would increase the individual's overall income and make them better off.  It is this 
concept that the study looks at, for if this is the true effect, then an affiliation bonus 
would be a positive factor in recruiting NAVETs in the SELRES. 
Using the theory of the decision to work, the underlying premise in the model is 
that a first term Navy enlistee who has not maximized their utility level upon entering the 
civilian work force will seek to increase their utility level.  To do so the individual could 
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take on a part-time job, increase their leisure time, or affiliate with the SELRES.  A 
decision to affiliate with the SELRES indicates that this use of their time offers the 
highest utility to the individual.  Thus the probability of affiliating with the SELRES 
could be determined by looking at the following factors:  
• The difference in wages made as a SELRES vice the wages that could be 
made at a civilian part-time job (all reserve wages are included here to 
include affiliation bonuses). 
• A matrix of personal characteristics (to include sex, race, age, marital 
status, education, geographic area, and ability, where ability is measured 
using Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores, whether the 
individual is a high school graduate, and their active duty paygrade). 
• The characteristics of a full-time job (measured in terms of the 
unemployment level in the state the NAVET claims as his home of record, 
and using the NAVETs Navy rating as a proxy for their earnings and 
employment potential.  
• The characteristics of a reserve job. 
• The characteristics of a part-time job.   
An issue of import with this model is that demand is not constant, and therefore 
affiliation may not be an accurate measure of the available NAVETs.  When this study 
was conducted it used the Reserve Recruiting and Manning Objectives System (RAMOS) 
to determine what ratings were overmanned.  RAMOS ratings D and E refer to ratings 
that are manned above 100%, and these ratings were omitted from the study in an effort 
to minimize the effect of demand constraints on the affiliation model. 
3.  Shiells' Estimation method 
The model Shiells developed to estimate the probability of a NAVET affiliating 
with the Naval Reserve is the following logit model: 
ln[(PA / (1-PA)]= β0 + β1 WRES + β2 URATE + β3 PG + β4 EDUC +  
β5 MG + β6 SEX + β7 RACE + β8 MARRIED + β9 AGE + 
   β10 REGIONS + β11 RATINGS + u, 
where the left hand side of the equation is the log of the odds that a NAVET will 
join the reserves, WRES is all forms of compensation given to reservists, URATE is the 
unemployment rate, PG is a matrix of dummy variables indicating the paygrade of the 
NAVET upon leaving active duty, EDUC is whether individual was a high school grad, 
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MG is mental group, SEX, RACE, MARRIED, AGE are self explanatory, REGIONS is 
what geographic census region the individual had as their home of record, and RATINGS 
is based upon the dummy variables taken from Shiells' study.  The estimation was done 
separately for each of the 11 rating groups.  The logit model was estimated using 
maximum likelihood techniques. 
4. Data 
The data sample consisted of NAVETs who separated after their first term 
enlistment and near the end of their obligated service.  The data set was constructed by 
finding active Navy losses from April 1979 to September 1984 on the Enlisted Master 
Records (EMRs) and matching them with SELRES affiliation in the Reserve Component 
Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS).  This sample identified 591,999 losses of 
which 444,264 were excluded for various reasons.  Of the remaining 147,735 records, 
2,174 were excluded due to missing data.  Finally, as a result of the demand constraint 
referred to earlier, 49,752 losses were excluded because the individuals were in closed 
ratings, and thus unable to affiliate with the SELRES.  This left the final number of 
records used in the model as 95,809.  
5. Shiells' Results 
The fit of the estimated model was good, with all 11 rating categories significant 
at the 1-percent level.  As Table 1 indicates, in six of the 11 rating groups, pay was both 
significant and positive.   
Table 1. Pay and Unemployment Rate Elasticities in Shiells (1986) 
Rating Group Pay Unemployment Rate
Seamanship 1.47** 0.35**
Elect Equip Repair 1.01** 0.37**
Comms / Intel 0.98** 0.34**
Medical 1.29** 0.51**
Other Technical 0.70 0.33
Admin / Clerical 1.95** 0.63**
Mech Equip Rep -Av -0.56 0.31**
Mech Equip Rep-Surf 0.44 0.63**
Craftsman 0.77* 0.63**
Service / Supply 0.16 0.54**
Unrated 0.25 0.90**
Note: Two asterisks indicate significance at the
1-percent confidence level, and one asterisk,
at the 5-percent level.
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In addition, higher unemployment rates significantly increase affiliation rates in 
10 of the 11 rating groups.   
The study focused primarily upon the effects on affiliation rates of a change in 
pay.  Shiells concludes that overall pay does have a significant impact on affiliation of 
NAVETs in the Navy Reserve.  This is based on two key results: the first looked at the 
percentage change in affiliation rates caused by a 1-percent change in real reserve wages, 
that is the pay elasticity.  The second looked at the estimated affiliation rates with and 
without an affiliation bonus program.  The first shows that NAVETs entering the reserves 
respond to pay, and that the higher the unemployment rate the higher the affiliation rate.  
The second indicates that for those rating groups where an affiliation bonus is available, 
the existence of the bonus had a positive impact on the affiliation rate.   
Shiells concludes that there are no differences in pay elasticity between regions; 
however, the study shows that there is an increased probability of a NAVET affiliating 
with the SELRES in certain regions.  Two of the strongest affiliation predictors found in 
the Shiells study were that of females and non-whites.  Female affiliation rates were 
higher than males in nine of the 11 rating groups, and non-whites affiliation rates were 
greater than whites in 10 of the 11 rating groups.  Age and marital status had almost no 
significance, while paygrade indicated that "fast tracked" sailors, those who enlisted 
under special programs allowing them to enter at a higher paygrade, were more apt to 
affiliate than junior personnel.  Overall, the study provides evidence that affiliation rates 
among NAVETs are predicted by certain characteristics, and these characteristics seem 
reasonable in all instances.   
B. AFFECTS OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM (ODS/S) 
Reserve mobilization was relatively unknown prior to ODS/S and thus the effects 
of mobilization on reserve affiliation and retention required study.  Sheila Kirby and 
Scott Naftel (1997, 1998) have led the charge researching the effects of reserve 
participation in ODS/S, and their findings may have some relevance to this study and 
future studies that use data taken shortly after September 11, 2001.  
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1. Costs and Benefits of Reserve Participation: New Evidence from the 
1992 Reserve Components Surveys (RCS) (Kirby, Grissman, 
Williamson, Naftel, 1997) 
Prior to ODS/S SELRES were unlikely to factor mobilization into their decision 
to affiliate.  This was the first of two studies to determine if mobilization had any effects 
on the decision of SELRES to reenlist.  These studies are being reviewed because there 
may be some relevant lessons that can be learned by analyzing the decision by an existing 
SELRES member to reenlist in an environment that includes potential mobilization, and a 
NAVET's decision to affiliate with the SELRES in the same environment.  In this study, 
the authors compared the responses from the 1986 and 1992 Reserve Components Survey 
(RCS) to find differences that might be attributable to mobilization, as well as compared 
responses from mobilized SELRES and non-mobilized SELRES who responded to the 
1992 RCS. 
The comparisons used in this study (Kirby et al., 1997) showed no dramatic 
change in overall behavior that could be attributable to ODS/S, and that little or no 
difference could be found in the overall retention rate of mobilized versus non-mobilized 
SELRES (Kirby et. al., 1997, p.xxi).  A few interesting results emerged when looking at 
the study's findings from a moonlighting versus SELRES job perspective.  The first is 
that potential income loss was determined to be the most important concern of SELRES 
when mobilized.  It is possible that for NAVET affiliates, this concern could sway them 
toward a civilian moonlighting job vice the SELRES if they believe their personal utility 
level would decrease as a result of joining the SELRES.  The second biggest concern 
regarding mobilization was found to be an unfair burden upon the spouse of a mobilized 
SELRES.  Again, this could sway a NAVET trying to maximize their personal utility. 
An important aspect of this study is that the mobilization that occurred during 
ODS/S was a popular one.  It was of a short duration, was very patriotic, put few 
individuals in imminent danger, and thus may have had a positive impact on post ODS/S 
retention.  The authors are quick to note that any findings in the comparisons they found 
were based upon ODS/S, and thus generalizations regarding other mobilizations would be 
dangerous.  This is an important warning as the post 9/11 mobilization began on a 
positive patriotic note, but as time has passed and SELRES mobilizations have become 
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lengthy the impact on future retention and NAVET affiliation is unknown.  We do know 
anecdotally that some active duty members have decided that it is better to either stay 
active or not affiliate with the SELRES.  They believe that because their skills and 
training are current they will be at the top of the mobilization list if they affiliate with the 
SELRES. 
2. The Effect of Mobilization on Retention of Enlisted Reservists After 
ODS/S (Kirby and Naftel, 1998) 
After finishing the initial comparison described above Kirby and Naftel conducted 
a statistical study asking how the mobilization affected SELRES.  Again this is being 
included in the literature review as a possible means of comparison to NAVET's decision 
to affiliate with the SELRES and because it used traditional moonlighting labor market 
theory as its basis.  The findings indicate that household monetary and non-monetary 
decisions, taking mobilization into consideration, affect the probability of retention 
among SELRES. 
The authors found four aspects of the reserves that set it apart from civilian sector 
part-time jobs: 1) the SELRES requires a substantial training investment; 2) potential 
longevity and job security exist with the SELRES; 3) retirement benefits; and 4) non-
pecuniary benefits not available in the civilian sector (Kirby and Naftel, 1998, p. 8). 
The study found that mobilization during ODS/S had little effect on the 
probability of SELRES retention.  Interestingly, the likelihood of being mobilized, as 
viewed by the SELRES himself, had a small positive effect on retention, suggesting that 
mobilization may be appreciated by SELRES members as means to show their worth and 
practice their skills (Kirby and Naftel, 1998, p. xiv).  As in the first study, spousal and 
family approval increased retention while a negative attitude decreased retention.  Of 
interest to the discussion concerning personal utility, it was found that mobilized 
SELRES members who experienced the greatest economic losses due to mobilization had 
lower retention rates. 
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C. RESERVE PARTICIPATION VERSUS MOONLIGHTING: ARE THEY 
THE SAME?  (MEHAY, 1990)  
1. Labor Supply Theory 
This study was conducted to determine if statistical differences exist between 
individuals who choose reserve participation over moonlighting in a civilian job.   The 
crux of the issue is whether reserve participation is simply a form of moonlighting, 
working a second job to increase income and thus increase personal utility, or whether it 
fits into a separate category because non-monetary aspects are taken into account by an 
individual when they choose to join the SELRES vice take a moonlighting job in the 
civilian sector.   
The study's hypothesis is that an individual has three alternatives to yield 
maximum personal utility: they can work one full-time job only, they can work a primary 
full-time job plus a moonlighting job, or they can work a primary full-time job plus 
participate in the SELRES (Mehay, p.327).  A number of factors were taken into account 
while determining the differences between the three options including; the hourly wage 
rate, work hours, other family income, military-to-civilian pay ratio, local economic 
conditions (unemployment), local population growth rate, and median rent.  These factors 
were all analyzed using data from 44 standard metropolitan statistical areas. 
2. Results 
Results from the study indicate that the decision to affiliate with the reserves is 
not equivalent to the decision to moonlight, and in fact the effect of the moonlighting 
labor supply variables on labor force choices differed significantly between the reserve 
and moonlighting options (Mehay, p. 336).  The following are some of the findings that 
led to this conclusion.  First, reservists, contrary to moonlighters, do not find 
underemployment on their primary job as an important reason to hold a second job.  
Secondly, the local economy acts differently on the two alternatives.  A poor economy 
decreases moonlighting opportunities and makes the reserves more attractive, while a 
good economy increases moonlighting opportunities and thus decreases the relative 
attractiveness of the reserves.  Third, an increase in family size increases the probability 
of reserve affiliation but decreases the chances of moonlighting.  Finally, geography 
plays in important role.  This could be partly due to the attitudes toward the military in 
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various geographic regions or the availability of meaningful reserve duty based upon 
proximity to the active fleet.    
D. FACTORS / DETERMINANTS 
Throughout the literature on reserve affiliation, a common theme is the need to 
account for demand constraints that affect affiliation opportunities.  Some of these are 
obvious, such as the number of NAVETs, while others such as regional differences, are 
not quite so straightforward.  The following are factors that must be taken into account 
when analyzing at reserve affiliation. 
1. Supply Constraints 
a. Geographic Specificity 
The reserve force is unique in that most SELRES are recruited, and 
subsequently drill, within 100 miles of their home (Asch, 1986 p.1).  Further, although 
the reserve force is represented in all 50 states, there are pockets of reserve influence 
surrounding the active Navy's main regional areas, mainly the east coast, west coast, and 
gulf regions.   
b. Unemployment Rate 
In conjunction with geographic specificity the possibility that economic 
variables differ by region could affect affiliation as well.  To account for this effect there 
is a need to take regional unemployment rates into account.  Past studies have used a pay 
elasticity to help account for this effect on supply.  Estimates of SELRES pay elasticities 
vary by study.  When based upon national unemployment rates without taking 
occupational skills into account SELRES have been shown to have pay elasticities 
ranging from 1.44 to 1.56 (Asch, 1986, p.6).  When SELRES ratings are factored into the 
analyses pay elasticities range from -.56 to 1.95 (Shiells, 1986, p26).  Of course, because 
these studies were conducted using data from the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
unemployment rates were relatively high, estimated in the area of 10 percent.  
c. Military to Civilian Pay Ratio 
Active recruiters and retention experts often use the military-to-civilian 
pay ratio to show how military pay compares to civilian sector pay.  By extension this 
determines whether the military enables an individual to meet their utility level, or 
whether their utility level is best met in the civilian sector.  This translates to the reserves 
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because if the economy is such that an individual's civilian job pays substantially more 
than their military job did, they may be less apt to join the SELRES.  On the other hand, 
if the economy is weak with a high unemployment rate, and consequentially a higher 
military to civilian pay ratio, a NAVET may be driven to affiliate with the SELRES to 
maintain their utility level at or near the level it was while in the active Navy.   
2. Demand Constraints 
a. Restricted Entry into Certain Ratings 
Due to the constant change in reserve requirements, at various times some 
ratings in the SELRES may be closed to NAVETs.  Thus the lack of demand for certain 
skills may constrain the number of accessions (Shiells, 1986, p.11).  Shiells used the 
Reserve Recruiting and Manning Objectives System (RAMOS) to determine what ratings 
were closed, and eliminated these individuals form here data.  Since 1986 the Navy has 
replaced RAMOS with Enlisted Classification and Manning Objective (ECMO) 
categories to determine overmanned ratings.   
b. Recruiter Goals 
Recruiters change their recruitment goals and strategies to meet the needs 
of the SELRES.  During the timeframe used in this study, the number of SELRES 
required has dramatically decreased as both the active and reserve Navy have reorganized 
and right-sized.  As a result, the goals recruiters had in the early 1990s are far different 
from those today.  On the one hand the decreased goals enable recruiters to be more 
selective, while on the other hand, the decreased size of the active Navy results in a 
smaller pool of NAVETs available for reserve recruiters to track.   
c. Non-Availability of Reserve Billets 
From 1990 to present the percentage of SELRES to active duty Navy has 
dropped slightly from 26 percent to 23 percent.  This small percentage drop combined 
with an overall decrease in numbers in both components could potentially lead to a 
situation where there is greater demand for reserve billets then exist.  Although this is 
unlikely to affect NAVETs because they are the preferred reserve recruit over a non-
prior-service individual, the possibility exists that a NAVETs skill set does not exist 
within the SELRES (Grissmer, Kirby, Buddin, Kawata, Sollinger, Williamson, 1994, 
p.10)  
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III. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
The data in this analysis was constructed using all active duty first term Navy 
enlisted losses from the Enlisted Master Records (EMR) from Fiscal Years 1990 to 2002 
and matching them by social security number (SSN) to SELRES affiliations in the 
Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) from Fiscal Years 
1990 to 2003.  All data files were provided by` the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC).  Reserve affiliation data from Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994 was derived using 
EMR decade Composite Loss Files, while all subsequent years affiliation data was 
derived using annual transaction roll-up files1.  The final data file included only NAVETs 
who separated after their first term enlistment, were eligible for the SELRES, and were 
either in the United States or one of its territories.  Excluding NAVETs who failed to 
meet these criteria, a total of 388,667 valid losses remained.  Table 2 shows the 
distribution of losses by fiscal year.  Notice that a large percentage of these losses 
occurred during the drawdown in the early 1990s. 
The annual roll-up data file contained numerous cases of multiple transactions for 
each unique SSN (i.e., each person).  Using transaction type as a basis, the duplicates 
were eliminated using the following logic: 
a. Transaction types that indicated 1) an individual was a reenlistment gain with a 
break-in-service of less than 91 days (not a new SELRES affiliate), 2) was considered a 
non-prior service affiliate, or 3) was gained from another reserve service component were 
deleted because they did not meet the requirements of a NAVET affiliating directly into 
the SELRES. 
b. If the transaction date most closely related to the individual's separation from 
active duty date indicated they had prior active service but were affiliating from the 
civilian sector, went directly from active duty into the reserves, were considered an 
"other" gain, affiliated directly from the active reserve force (AGR) to the SELRES, or 
1 EMR decade Composite Loss files are the oldest reserve data files DMDC possesses.  They are an 
accumulation of data obtained over the course of the decade.  The annual transaction files are annual files 
DMDC began keeping in 1995.  These files are more robust and provide more detailed information than the 
decade Composite Loss file of the 1990s. 
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from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the SELRES then this transaction date was 
maintained, and all other transaction dates were deleted. 
 
Table 2. Active Duty Losses by Fiscal Year 
      
Fiscal Number of Percent of
Year NAVETs Losses 
1990 40,951 10.5 
1991 39,365 10.1 
1992 43,467 11.2 
1993 42,070 10.8 
1994 36,304 9.3 
1995 26,857 6.9 
1996 22,565 5.8 
1997 29,217 7.5 
1998 18,966 4.9 
1999 19,801 5.1 
2000 21,252 5.5 
2001 25,106 6.5 
2002 22,716 5.9 
  388,637 100 
Source: Author 
c. If the most recent transaction date indicated the individual went from the 
SELRES to the AGR, this date was deleted and the above logic was run on the next most 
recent transaction date. 
d. If the transaction type listed in the data field was anything other than those 
described above, the transaction for the individual was deleted.   
The use of this logic resulted in a single transaction data line for each unique SSN 
in the data file. 
The DMDC EMR data file was merged with the annual transaction roll-up files to 
produce a single file of all personnel losses from Fiscal Years 1990 to 2002.  If an SSN 
existed in both data files, the data from the annual roll-up files was used.  The end result 
was a single data file with one transaction date and type for each unique SSN (individual) 
who affiliated with the SELRES from 1990 to 2002.  The active duty separation date was 
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subtracted from the reserve transaction date to determine the length of time between 
separation and reserve affiliation for each observation. 
Unemployment data was merged into the data file using state unemployment rate 
statistics obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the years 1989 to 2003.  The 
individual's active duty separation date was used to determine what unemployment year 
to assign to them, and the individual's unemployment state was either their active duty 
home of record, for non-reserve affiliates, or their reserve duty state, for reserve affiliates. 
Reserve affiliation bonus information was not used in the model.  The data set 
described above indicated that only 217 of the 388,637 observations received an 
affiliation bonus.  This was not believed to be an accurate reflection of reality as the data 
set indicated over 70,000 affiliates had an 'unknown' bonus.  Because of missing 
information, affiliation bonus could not be used as an explanatory variable in the model. 
An attempt was made to create rating group categories.  The rating groups were 
formulated based on those used by Shiells (1986), with some differences.  Table 3 
describes how the 111 ratings, found in the data set, were assigned to 10 rating groups. 
Table 3. Classification of Ratings into Occupational Categories 
Source: Author 
1 Seamanship BM, GM, GMG, GMM, QM
2 Electronic Equipment Repair AQ, AX, CTM, DS, ET, FC
FT, FTB, FTG, MT, ST, STG, STS, TM
3 Communications / Intelligence AC, AW, CTI, CTO, CTR, CTT, EW, IC, 
IS, IT, OS, OT, OTA, OTM, RM, SM
4 Medical DA, DR, DN, DT, HA, HR, HN, HM
5 Administrative / Clerical AK, AZ, CTA, DK, DP, JO, LN, 
MA, NC, PC, PN, RP, SK, YN
6 Mechanical Equipment Repair AB, ABE, ABF, ABH, AD, AE, AM, AME, 
 - Aviation AMH, AMS, AO, AS, ASE, ASM, AT 
7 Mechanical Equipment Repair BT, CM, DC, EM, EN, GS, GSE, GSM, 
 - Surface IM, MM, MN, OM, WT
8 Craftsman and other Technical BU, CE, EO, HT, LI, ML, MR, PM, 
SW, UT, AG, DM, EA, MU, PH
9 Service / Supply MS, PR, SH
10 Non-rates AA, AR, AN, CA, CR, CN, 
FA, FR, FN, SA, SR, SN
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  Finally, after accounting for lost observations due to missing variables, a total of 
388,637 observations were used in the analysis.  Of these 388,637 NAVETs, 43,611 
affiliated with the SELRES. 
B. CLOSED RATINGS 
Past research in this area has taken into account the fact that not all NAVETs are 
eligible for affiliation with the SELRES.  Shiells' (1986) accounted for the demand 
constraint associated with closed ratings in the SELRES by omitting observations from 
her data set that were in closed ratings, defined as those ratings which were manned 
above 100 percent and for which SELRES affiliation was not authorized.  The Navy has 
changed the mechanism with which these ratings are determined since Shiells' study 
(1986), and now determines these closed ratings using Enlisted Career Management 
Objectives (ECMO) categories.    Despite the name change, the concept remains the same 
and it would seem that individuals in closed ECMO categories should be excluded from 
the data set.   
However, over the past decade the number of non-prior service (NPS) personnel 
in the Naval Reserve has crept upward putting a strain on the force.  As VADM Cotton 
Commander of the Naval Reserve Forces stated while discussing the need for NAVETs: 
The Zero Based Review is an opportunity.  It's already started and it's 
going to continue for the foreseeable future.  A reservist of the future, we 
want them to be NAVETs.  We want people who have served, who have 
gone to bootcamp.  Maybe they came out and did something in civilian 
life, but they still have those skill sets.  We want to give them the onramp 
to come back in and complete their Navy careers, overall it's a wonderful 
opportunity. (VADM Cotton, Navy News Update, 21 Sep 2004)   
In an attempt to minimize NPS personnel and maximize the number of NAVETs 
in the SELRES, Commander Naval Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC) has made 
continuous changes to their Drilling Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals and Policies 
letters over the past few years.  Unfortunately, much of this flexibility is not quantifiable.  
As the need to affiliate NAVETs has increased it is plausible that the number of waivers 
that have been allowed in closed ratings has also increased.  In addition, the policy 
changes have also affected the use of the RESCORE-R program (CNRFC letters).  This 
program, the normal method of affiliating an individual in a closed ECMO category, 
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allows for individuals in identified closed ratings to affiliate with the SELRES by 
accessing into open ratings via a change of rating.  Requirements for the program include 
the following: 
a. Individual must be in paygrades E4 through E6. 
b. They must be within 60 months of active duty separation. 
c. They must agree to convert from an ECMO category "C" (closed) rating to an 
ECMO category "A" (open) rating. 
d. They must obligate to the reserves for four years. 
e. Must complete lateral conversion requirements within ten months of affiliation. 
f. Must participate in the first advancement exam they are eligible for. 
g. Rating conversion NEC must be requested upon enlistment. 
(CNRFINST 1001.5 series). 
The tracking of individuals who affiliated in the SELRES via the RESCORE-R program 
or whom received waivers would be difficult, but they are likely to constitute a 
significant number of affiliates over the years covered in the sample in this analysis.  Not 
being able to identify observations based upon Reserve Recruiting and Manning 
Objectives System (RAMOS) or ECMO categories could therefore lead to inaccuracies in 
identifying eligible NAVETs as well as the number of NAVET affiliates.  However, due 
to the difficulty of identifying people in these categories, RAMOS and ECMO category 
ineligible personnel were not excluded from this data set. 
C. DEPENDENT VARIABLE - AFFILIATION IN THE NAVAL SELECTED 
RESERVE 
The dependent variable used in this study represents affiliation decisions in the 
Naval Selected Reserve.  Affiliation is measured by a binary variable based on the time 
between individuals' separation from the active duty Navy and their affiliation with the 
SELRES.  To determine the elapsed time between separation and affiliation, the 
separation date was subtracted from the affiliation date.  If the difference between the 
dates was less than or equal to one year the individual was considered an affiliate; those 
who affiliated outside of one year or who never affiliated were considered non-affiliates.  
In the estimated logit model, the dependent variable is the log of the odds that a NAVET 
will join the SELRES; 43,611 NAVETs, or 11.2 percent of all eligible NAVETs found in 
this sample affiliated with the SELRES within one year of separation from active duty.  
Table 4 depicts affiliation by rating group.  Overall, the technical rating groups 
(electronic equipment repair and mechanical equipment repair) have the lowest affiliation 
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rates while the non-technical rating groups (e.g., 'non-rates' and 'seamanship') have some 
of the highest affiliation rates. 
Table 4. SELRES Affiliation Rates by Rating Group 
Source: Author 
D. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
In this section, the definitions of the independent variables used in the logit model 
are explained.  Table 5 lists the descriptive statistics for the entire sample while Table 6 
provides descriptive statistics for each rating group.  
1. Reserve Pay 
Reserve pay was computed based on the assumption that a reservist maximizes 
their annual drill time.  It was assumed that an individual would complete one weekend 
drill each month (12 months * 4 drills per month) and two weeks of annual active duty 
training (14 days of training) each year.  This would give each individual 62 drills per 
year.  Using the annual pay tables for military members, annual pay was calculated using 
the individual's paygrade and length of service.  Annual pay data was obtained from the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service. 
The resulting pay was then indexed in real 1978 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index obtained in the Economic Report of the President (2003). In real 1978 dollars, the 
average annual pay across this data was $1103.  Surprisingly this was an average 
decrease in real pay of  $33 from the period covered by Shiells (1986). 
Rating Group # of Affiliates # NAVETS Affiliation Rate
SEAMANSHIP 4,004 24,625 16.3
ELECTRONIC REPAIR 1,363 31,299 4.4
COMMS / INTEL 5,678 57,559 9.9
MEDICAL 3,315 25,084 13.2
ADMIN / CLERICAL 4,470 37,627 11.9
MECH REP - AVIATION 7,375 66,921 11.0
MECH REP - SURF 5,424 66,380 8.2
CRAFTSMAN / TECH 2,090 20,408 10.2
SERVICE / SUPPLY 2,315 20,165 11.5
NON-RATES 7,577 38,569 19.6
All Ratings 43,611 388,637 11.2
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Pooled Sample 
      
Number of NAVETs 388,637  
Number of Affiliates 43,611  
Average Real Reserve Wages (1978 $) 1,103  
Average unemployment rate 5.7  
Average age 23   
Percent of NAVETs   
     Affiliating 11.2  
     Male 86.8  
     Female 13.2  
     Married 36.8  
     White 67.2  
     Black 18.4  
     Hispanic 9.5  
     Other Race 5.0  
     With dependents 15.5  
     HS Grad 93.8  
     In paygrade E3 26.7  
     In paygrade E4 56.9  
     In paygrade E5 17.0  
     AFQT category 1 4.1  
     AFQT category 2 31.2  
     AFQT category 3A 21.6  
     AFQT category 3B 29.5  
     AFQT category 4 or lower 4.9  
Region used for unemployment rate   
     New England 2.7  
     Middle Atlantic 11.2  
     South Atlantic 18.7  
     East North Central 16.0  
     East South Central 5.0  
     West North Central 7.0  
     West South Central 12.4  
     Mountain 4.1  







Table 6. Descriptive Statistics by Rating Groups 
Source: Author
Rating Group Seaman Elect Equip Comms/ Medical Admin/ Mech Equip Mech Equip Craftsman/ Service/ Non-Rates
Repair Intel Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply
Number of NAVETs 24,518 30,877 57,279 24,819 37,421 66,663 65,771 20,258 20,042 38,471
Number of Ratings 5 14 16 8 14 15 13 15 3 12
Percent of NAVETs
     Affiliating 16.3 4.4 9.9 13.1 11.8 11.0 8.2 10.2 11.5 19.7
     Female 6.2 7.8 15.3 26.8 25.4 8.4 7.1 11.6 13.8 17.1
     Married 33.0 39.7 34.4 45.9 39.6 37.9 36.9 40.6 37.7 27.2
     Black 17.9 9.5 21.6 17.1 25.9 12.7 15.6 10.0 33.2 26.0
     Hispanic 9.2 7.4 8.0 10.8 10.4 10.7 9.4 8.0 8.7 11.1
     With dependents 14.9 14.9 13.6 16.9 17.3 15.7 16.3 18.7 19.0 12.0
     non-HS Grad 7.7 5.3 6.0 4.6 5.8 7.6 5.7 7.8 5.3 5.9
     AFQT category 1 2.7 11.9 3.8 3.1 2.8 2.3 7.6 2.1 0.7 1.1
     AFQT category 3A 22.2 12.0 25.3 27.2 24.9 23.8 17.8 25.3 18.9 19.3
     AFQT category 3B 33.9 5.1 22.2 21.3 27.7 31.9 31.7 31.0 49.3 45.7
     AFQT category 4 or 5 9.2 0.3 2.5 1.1 3.6 4.1 6.8 5.1 10.1 8.7
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2. Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment data used in this study was based on annual, not seasonally 
adjusted, state unemployment rates taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Unemployment data was assigned to individual NAVETs in the following way.  If a 
NAVET affiliated with the SELRES then the NAVET's state of reserve duty was used to 
determine the unemployment rate.  If the NAVET did not affiliate their active duty home-
of-record was used to determine unemployment rate.  This was done to better align the 
local unemployment rate, and thus local economic conditions, with the individual's 
location when they made the decision to affiliate.  Finally, if no state data was available 
for an individual, then the national annual unemployment rate was assigned based on 
their year of separation.  In all cases the calendar year of separation was used. 
3. Paygrade  
The predominant paygrade in the sample was E4, accounting for over 57 percent 
of NAVETs.  Paygrade E3 made up another quarter in the sample, with the remainder 
dispersed among the other paygrades.  Paygrade was only used in the preliminary 
models, not the final model being reported, due to collinerarity with age, length of 
service, and reserve pay (which is determined using paygrade and length of service). 
4. Education and Ability 
Rather than distinguish between high school graduate and non-high school 
graduate, this study used three variables to analyze education: high school graduate, non-
high school graduate and those who earn their General Educational Development (GED) 
certificate.  In many studies GED is assigned to the non-high school graduate category; 
however, it was maintained as a separate variable in this model.  Over 94 percent of the 
NAVETs in the sample were high school graduates, with 3.5 percent GED certificate 
holders and less than 2.5 percent non-high school graduates. 
In addition to high school diploma status, the NAVETs Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score category was used to determine their mental category.  
Categories I, II, IIIA and IIIB were modeled separately while categories IV and V were 
combined.   The majority of NAVETs fell in AFQT categories II and IIIB, with 30 
percent in each, followed by AFQT category IIIA with 21 percent.  The other categories 
contained less than 5 percent of the sample of NAVETs. 
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5. Personal / Demographic Characteristics 
The model included marital status, race, gender, dependents, and age to determine 
the demographic influencers on affiliation.  The base case in the model was a single, 
white, male with no dependents averaging 23 years of age.  Four dummy variables were 
constructed for race so that white, black, hispanic, and all other races could be modeled 
separately.  Marital status and dependent status were binary and based upon the 
NAVET's status at separation.  Age was also the NAVET's age at time of separation. 
6. Geographic Regions 
As noted in the section on the unemployment rate, each NAVET was assigned a 
state based upon either their active duty home-of-record or their reserve duty state (i.e., 
the state where they affiliated).  These assignments were used to construct the 
unemployment rate; however, it would be too unwieldy to establish dummy variables for 
all 50 states, Washington D.C., as well as the three US territories found in the data.  
Instead, following the lead of Shiells (1986), the census regions as described in Table 7 
were used to determine if regional differences influenced NAVET affiliation.  Using 
census regions also helps alleviate some of the inaccuracy that occurs from using home-
of-record, as many first-term separators do not return to their home-of-record upon 
separation but stay in the area where they served.  The use of regions in the model helps 
to offset this problem. 
Table 7. Census Regions 
    
Census Region States 
New England ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT 
Middle Atlantic NY, NJ, PA 
South Atlantic DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL 
East North Central MI, OH, IN, WI, IL 
East South Central KY, TN, AL, MS 
West North Central MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS 
West South Central AR, LA, OK, TX 
Mountain MT, WY, CO, NM, ID, UT, AZ, NV 
Pacific WA, OR, CA, AK, HI 





Separate models were estimated for each of the 10 rating groups defined in Table 
3 as well as a single model that included all rating groups. 
8. Separation Year 
Dummy variables were constructed for the NAVET's year of separation from 
active duty and included in all models.  Affiliation rates by year are displayed in Table 8.  
The drawdowns that occurred in the early 1990s, and again at the beginning of this 
decade, are apparent.  It is conceivable that active duty policies have had a greater effect 
on reserve affiliation decisions then expected. 
 
Table 8. SELRES Affiliation Rates by Fiscal Year 
Source: Author 
E. ESTIMATION METHOD 
The primary model that is estimated based on the above variable definitions is the 
following logit model: 
ln[(PA / (1-PA)] = β0 + β1RESPAY + β2UNEMPLOY_RATE + β3AFQT + 
β4HS_EDUC + β5DEPENDENT + β6GENDER +  
β7RACE + β8MARRIED + β9AGE + β10SEP_YEAR + 
β11REGIONS + β12RATINGS + u. 
















Maximum likelihood logit estimation is used.  If a NAVET does not affiliate with the 
SELRES, PA = 0.  As stated earlier, estimation is done separately for each of the 10 rating 
groups as well as for all rating groups combined. 
 A number of additional models were constructed to test the thesis that there was a 
difference in affiliation over time.  The first were constructed to determine if there was a 
difference between the drawdown years of the early 1990s versus the other years in the 
sample.  A pooled model was constructed that excluded the dummy variables for 
separation year.  Then two restricted models were constructed.  One restricted model 
contained observations from separation years 1992 to 1994 only, while in the second 
restricted model, all separation years were included with the exception of 1992 to 1994. 
 A second hypothesis was tested to determine if a difference in affiliation could be 
attributed to the 'dot-com' boom and bust experienced in the late 1990s and at the turn of 
the century.  Two models were constructed to test this thesis.  The first model contained 
only the separation years 1997 to 1999, while the second model contained separation 




Overall the fit of the pooled model was good, with 39 of the 44 explanatory 
variables significant at the 1 percent level, and another four variables significant at the 5 
percent level and a very high Chi-square statistic for the model.  The logits from the 
pooled model are described in Table 9. 
Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Logit Coefficient Estimates for Pooled Model 
Pooled Group Pooled Group
INTERCEPT -2.4705 SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0369
(0.1089) ** (0.0259)
RESPAY 0.0003 NON-RATES 0.5704
(0.00009) ** (0.0204) **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.1025 SEP_FY_90 0.6082
(0.0049) ** (0.0227) **
FEMALE 0.0757 SEP_FY_91 0.3571
(0.0156) ** (0.0221) **
MARRIED -0.4064 SEP_FY_93 -0.3526
(0.0138) ** (0.0243) **
BLACK 0.1632 SEP_FY_94 -0.1094
(0.0141) ** (0.0251) **
HISPANIC 0.1912 SEP_FY_95 0.2377
(0.0177) ** (0.0267) **
OTHER RACE -0.0813 SEP_FY_96 0.3744
(0.027) ** (0.0279) **
NON-HSGRAD -0.0809 SEP_FY_97 0.5617
(0.0365) * (0.0261) **
GED -0.1026 SEP_FY_98 0.5049
(0.0294) ** (0.0303) **
CHILD -0.048 SEP_FY_99 0.5282
(0.0191) * (0.0309) **
CURRENT AGE -0.0323 SEP_FY_00 0.5465
(0.0022) ** (0.0343) **
AFQT 1 -0.3862 SEP_FY_01 0.1942
(0.036) ** (0.0327) **
AFQT 3A 0.0625 SEP_FY_02 -0.1269
(0.0148) ** (0.0345) **
AFQT 3B 0.1878 NORTHEAST 0.2146
(0.0139) ** (0.0316) **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.3482 MID-ATLANTIC 0.1253
(0.0244) ** (0.0174) **
SEAMANSHIP 0.3738 SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.0521
(0.0217) ** (0.0159) **
ELECTRONIC EQUIP -0.888 EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.0576
(0.0312) ** (0.0248) *
COMMS / INTEL -0.1402 WEST NORTH CENTRAL 0.4054
(0.0192) ** (0.0218) **
MEDICAL 0.2769 WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.1851
(0.0231) ** (0.0169) **
ADMIN / CLERICAL 0.0599 MOUNTAIN -0.0781
(0.0208) ** (0.0297) **
EQUIP REP SURFACE -0.3473 PACIFIC -0.4007
(0.0192) ** (0.0268) **
CRAFTSMAN / TECH -0.0551 Log-Likelihood Ratio 259,173.54
(0.0267) * Chi-Square 11,970.20
Observations 386,119
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(The maximum likelihood logit coefficient estimates for separate models for each of the 
10 rating groups are presented in Table A-1 of Appendix A).  Table 9 lists the parameter 
estimates from the pooled logit model.  The logit is defined as the effect of a change in an 
explanatory variable on the log of the odds of a NAVET affiliating with the SELRES.  
Table A-2 of Appendix A presents the partial effects of the variables converted from logit 
coefficients.  Partial effects are estimates of the change in the probability of a NAVET 
affiliating when each explanatory variable changes by one unit.  The remainder of this 
section will be devoted to explaining the partial effects of some of the more influential 
and significant explanatory variables. 
A. PAY AND UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 
Across all rating groups pay had a significant and positive effect on SELRES 
affiliation, with a $1000 increase in pay increasing the probability of affiliation by 1.8 
percentage points.  Within the 10 separate rating group models, pay was significant and 
positive at the 1 percent level in four out of 10 groups.  Pay was significant and negative 
in two rating groups, Administration and Mechanical Equipment Repair - Aviation.  This 
would infer that some unobserved factor affected these specific rating groups and that the 
unobserved factor was different for these and other rating groups. 
Elasticities were used to measure the relative responsiveness of SELRES 
affiliation rates to changes in pay and changes in local unemployment rates.  The pay 
elasticity is the percentage change in the affiliation rate due to a 1 percent change in 
reserve pay, as previously defined.  The unemployment elasticity is the percentage 
change in affiliation rate due to a 1 percent change in the local unemployment rate.  Table 
10 lists the pay and unemployment elasticities derived from the separate models for the 
10 individual rating groups as well as from the pooled model.  Elasticities were computed 
using the equation βi X i(1-PA) where PA is the sample probability of affiliation, X i is the 
mean explanatory variable and βi is the estimated coefficient of X i.  In this case both X i 
and PA are evaluated at their sample means.  The elasticity is significant if the coefficient 
β is significant. 
Of the six significant pay variables; three of the pay elasticities have become 
more elastic since the time of the Shiells (1986) study.  This indicates that pay has a 
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different effect on individuals based upon their skill set, and that the effect of pay on 
affiliation decisions has not declined and may, in fact, have risen over time.  It is of 
particular note that technical ratings are much more responsive to pay than non-technical 
ratings.  This is logical because NAVETs with technical skills are more apt to find a 
quality job in the civilian sector that pays enough for them to maintain their utility level 
without the need to moonlight and take a part-time job.  However, despite the findings in 
the individual rating groups, pay tends to be inelastic across all rating groups. 
 
Table 10. Pay and Unemployment Rate Elasticities by Rating Group 
      
Rating Group Pay Unemployment 
    Rate 
Group 1: Seamanship  -0.47  0.23* 
Group 2: Electronic Repair     1.44** 0.27 
Group 3: Comms / Intel     1.76**   0.24** 
Group 4: Medical     2.25**   0.40** 
Group 5: Admin   -0.58*   0.31** 
Group 6: Mechanical - Aviation    -1.63**   0.67** 
Group 7: Mechanical - Surface     1.39**   0.66** 
Group 8: Craftsman / Technical   0.31   0.55** 
Group 9: Service   -0.45   0.75** 
Group 10: Non-Rates   0.61   0.73** 
All Rating Groups     0.25**   0.52** 
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level  
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level  
Source: Based on Table A-1 
The range of significant pay elasticities is from -1.63 for Mechanical Equipment 
Repair - Aviation to 2.25 for Medical ratings.  Using the pay elasticity for the 
Communication and Intelligence ratings of 1.76, for example, affiliation rates will 
increase by 1.76 percent for every 1 percent increase in reserve pay.  The average real 
reserve pay for this rating group was $1,133, so a 10 percent increase in real reserve pay 
would increase the affiliation rate by 17.6 percent, from 9.9 to 11.6 (the initial affiliation 
rate was taken from Table 6).  The two significant and negative pay elasticities seem 
implausible.  It would seem unlikely that any skill set would be less apt to affiliate when 
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pay is increased, indicating that the model is not accounting for factors that affect 
affiliation, at least for these two rating groups.   
Table 10 shows that the unemployment rate elasticity is significant in nine of the 
10 rating groups as well as across all rating groups.  Using the unemployment rate 
elasticity for the Communication and Intelligence ratings of 0.24 as an example, 
affiliation rates will increase by .24 percent for every 1 percent increase in unemployment 
rate.  The average unemployment rate for this rating group was 5.7 percent, so a 10 
percent increase in unemployment rate would increase the affiliation rate by .57 percent, 
from 0.24 to 0.38 NAVETs.  Overall, the unemployment rate elasticity has remained 
relatively constant and inelastic across rating groups.  These findings compare very 
closely with those of Shiells (1986), indicating that the unemployment effect has not 
changed with regard to its effect on affiliation across the two periods analyzed, and that 
an increase in unemployment rate increases SELRES affiliation. 
B.  REGIONAL EFFECTS  
The partial effect of the probability of affiliation based upon a NAVET's census 
region is given in Table 11 for both the pooled model and the individual rating groups.  
The baseline region is the East North Central region, thus all effects are the estimated 
changes in the probability of affiliation if the NAVET lived in a given region vice the 
East North Central region.  Across all rating groups, census region is significant in every 
region with NAVETs in the South Atlantic, Mountain, and Pacific regions less likely to 
affiliate than those in all other regions.  NAVETs in the mid-western regions and New 
England had the highest affiliation rates. 
In the separate occupational rating group regressions, 80 regional coefficients 
were estimated based on eight regions and 10 rating groups.  Of these, 40 estimates were 
significant, 28 being significant and positive and the remaining 12 being significant and 
negative.  The West North Central was positive and significant in all 10 rating groups, 
while the West South Central was positive and significant in eight of   10 rating groups.  
The New England and Mid-Atlantic regions were also significant and positive in four and 
five of the rating groups respectively.  Only the Pacific region, with nine of 10 significant 
and negative estimates, showed any consistently negative affiliation trends.  The South 
Atlantic, East South Central and Mountain regions showed little significance across 
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rating groups, and thus there is not apt to be any differences between affiliation rates 
these regions and the base region, the East North Central.  The significant estimates from 
the four significantly positive regions (West North Central, West South Central. Mid-
Atlantic, and New England) ranged from .0007 to .0997.  Using Group 8, Craftsman, in 
the West North Central as an example, 4.8 more NAVETs in this rating group are 
expected to affiliate per 100 then will affiliate from the East North Central region.  
Likewise, 6.7 fewer NAVETs in this rating group, from the Pacific region, are expected 
to affiliate per 100 as compared to the East North Central region. 
 Interestingly, it is two of the heartland regions that have the highest probability of 
affiliation, while the Pacific region, one of the Navy's central locations had a lower 
probability of affiliation as compared to the East North Central.  There are any number of 
reasons for the differences, including lifestyle choices, civilian job opportunities, rural 
versus urban environments, and cost of living.  However, because both annual reserve 
pay and unemployment rate by state were factored into the model the reasons are 




Table 11. Partial Effect of Regional Variables on PA 
Source: Based on Table A-1 
Pooled Seaman Elect Eq Comms/ Medical Admin/ Mech Eq Mech Eq Craftsman/ Service/ Non-
Ratings Repair Intel Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply Rates
New England 0.0169 ** 0.0141 0.0007 0.0040 * 0.0010 0.0346 0.0406 * 0.0023 ** 0.0107 0.0104 0.0423 **
Middle Atlantic 0.0095 ** 0.0325 * -0.0003 0.0018 0.0012 0.0190 0.0203 * 0.0011 ** 0.0236 * 0.0048 0.0185 **
South Atlantic -0.0037 ** -0.0326 * -0.0005 -0.0022 ** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0097 -0.0003 -0.0091 -0.0111 0.0003
East South Central 0.0042 * 0.0270 -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0022 0.0266 * -0.0081 0.0005 0.0047 0.0186 0.0102
West North Central 0.0346 ** 0.0997 ** 0.0034 ** 0.0081 ** 0.0070 ** 0.0753 ** 0.0815 ** 0.0023 ** 0.0476 ** 0.0867 ** 0.0650 **
West South Central 0.0144 ** 0.0702 ** 0.0011 0.0034 ** 0.0040 ** 0.0260 ** 0.0448 ** 0.0007 ** 0.0155 0.0219 * 0.0297 **
Mountain -0.0054 ** -0.0254 -0.0004 -0.0033 * 0.0017 -0.0100 -0.0222 -0.0003 -0.0100 -0.0185 -0.0132
Pacific -0.0244 ** -0.1695 ** -0.0002 -0.0080 ** -0.0022 * -0.0688 ** -0.0963 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0669 ** -0.0512 ** -0.0496 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level
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C.  PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 12 depicts the partial effects of the personal characteristic variables in the 
model.  In the pooled model (containing all rating groups), gender, marital status, race, 
dependent status, and age at separation were all significant.  Overall, being a female 
increases the probability of affiliating in the SELRES by .56 percentage points, being 
married decreases the probability of affiliation by 2.46 percentage points, being Black or 
Hispanic increases the probability of affiliating by 1.26 and 1.49 percentage points 
respectively, while being of an "other" ethnic minority decreases the probability by .56 
percentage points.  Having a child decreases the probability of affiliation by .34 
percentage points.  Thus, a married person with a child is nearly 3 percentage points less 
likely to affiliate.  For each year of age over 23 years old at separation the probability of 
affiliation is reduced by .23 percentage points. 
Looking at the 10 rating groups separately (see Appendix A, Table A-2) the 
partial effect of being female is significant in only four of the 10 rating groups; it is 
significant and negative in the communications and intelligence ratings.  The partial 
effect of being married is significant and negative in all 10 of the rating groups, which 
may indicate that when married, time and family issues take priority over money.  
Alternatively, it may be that marriage provides an opportunity to have a dual-income 
family and thus reduces the need for a part-time job.  The partial effect of being Black is 
significant and positive in six rating groups and the partial effect of being Hispanic is 
significant and positive in five of the rating groups, suggesting that minorities are more 
apt to take part-time jobs than whites.  However, this could also reflect the occupational 
skill sets of minorities and their ability to obtain a quality job in the civilian sector.  
NAVETs of 'other' ethnicity have a negative probability of affiliating with the SELRES 
that is significant in three of the 10 rating groups, suggesting that culture and ethnicity 
have differing effects on affiliation probabilities.  The partial effects of having a child are 
only significant in three rating groups, all of which are negative.  This is somewhat 
counterintuitive because there is an expectation that increased pay would be required for 
a larger family.  However, this suggests that quality of life outweighs the increased pay 
that would come from affiliating with the SELRES.  Finally, the partial effect of age at 
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separation is significant and negative in eight of the 10 rating groups.  The older a 
NAVET is at the time of separation, the less likely they are to affiliate.  
D. EDUCATION AND MENTAL CATEGORY 
Table 13 shows that across all rating groups the partial effect of both education, as 
measured by high school diploma, and AFQT mental category are significant.  Not 
surprisingly, the partial effect of being a non-high school graduate or a GED holder are 
negative.  This concurs with relationships found in previous studies.  Across the 10 rating 
group models, the partial effect of being a non-high school graduate is significant in five 
rating groups; however, three of these are negative and two are positive.  The two rating 
groups with positive and significant partial effects, Electronic Technician and Mechanical 
Equipment Repair - Surface, both have more highly educated individuals within the 
ratings.  Only two of the 10 rating groups had a significant partial effect for GED, and 
both of these are negative. 
In the pooled ratings model, the partial effect of mental category falls in line with 
what is expected.  Those in AFQT category I are less likely to affiliate with the SELRES 
because they have the ability to get a quality civilian job, which reduces their need for 
part-time employment.  The partial effect for NAVETs in AFQT categories IIIA and 
higher have a higher probability of affiliating than the baseline NAVET in AFQT 
category II, and this probability increases as the AFQT category increases.  This leads to 
the belief that the lower the mental group, the less apt the NAVET is to obtain a quality 
civilian job and thus the higher the probability they will affiliate with the SELRES to 
make up for the lower income obtained in the civilian sector. 
Across the 10 rating groups, the partial effect of being in AFQT category I is 
significant and negative in four of the 10 rating groups.  The partial effect of AFQT 
category IIIA is significant in six rating groups; however, the signs are not consistent, 
with two being negative and four being positive.  As the mental category decreases the 
number of positive estimates increases.  The partial effect for AFQT category IIIB is 
significant and positive in five of the 10 rating groups, while for AFQT category IV and 
V the effect is significant and positive in seven of the 10 groups. 
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Table 12. Partial Effect of Personal Characteristics on PA 
Source: Based on Table A-1 
Table 13. Partial Effect of Education and AFQT on PA 
Source: Based on Table A-1
Pooled Seaman Elect Eq Comms/ Medical Admin/ Mech Eq Mech Eq Craftsman/ Service/ Non-
Ratings Repair Intel Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply Rates
FEMALE 0.0056 ** -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0017 * -0.0006 0.0652 ** 0.0314 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0015 0.0115 -0.0061
MARRIED -0.0246 ** -0.1057 ** -0.0025 ** -0.0074 ** -0.0048 ** -0.0680 ** -0.0779 ** -0.0013 ** -0.0445 ** -0.0456 ** -0.0363 **
BLACK 0.0126 ** -0.0090 0.0002 0.0033 ** -0.0010 0.0194 ** 0.0414 ** 0.0015 ** -0.0125 0.0251 ** 0.0416 **
HISPANIC 0.0149 ** 0.0112 0.0008 0.0051 ** -0.0003 0.0382 ** 0.0636 ** 0.0017 ** 0.0094 0.0147 0.0201 **
OTHER RACE -0.0056 ** -0.0431 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0043 ** -0.0278 * -0.0081 0.0007 * -0.0022 -0.0421 ** -0.0003
CHILD -0.0034 * 0.0151 -0.0018 ** -0.0019 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0054 -0.0005 * -0.0248 * -0.0144 0.0099
CURRENT AGE -0.0023 ** -0.0191 ** 0.0001 -0.0005 ** -0.0004 ** -0.0047 ** -0.0069 ** 0.0000 -0.0082 ** -0.0058 ** -0.0068 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level
Pooled Seaman Elect Eq Comms/ Medical Admin/ Mech Eq Mech Eq Craftsman/ Service/ Non-
Ratings Repair Intel Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply Rates
NON-HSGRAD -0.0056 * -0.0125 0.0063 ** -0.0018 0.0018 -0.0453 * -0.0551 ** 0.0011 * -0.0196 -0.0254 -0.0314 **
GED -0.0071 ** -0.0313 -0.0005 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0430 ** -0.0111 0.0000 -0.0250 -0.0246 -0.0197 **
AFQT 1 -0.0236 ** -0.0246 -0.0015 ** -0.0032 * -0.0018 0.0050 -0.0258 -0.0029 ** -0.0479 -0.0639 -0.0378 **
AFQT 3A 0.0046 ** -0.0169 0.0038 ** 0.0026 ** 0.0015 * -0.0051 -0.0179 * 0.0028 ** 0.0059 -0.0086 -0.0156 **
AFQT 3B 0.0146 ** 0.0399 ** 0.0084 ** 0.0072 ** 0.0032 ** 0.0017 -0.0085 0.0040 ** 0.0051 0.0099 0.0073
AFQT 4A or 5 0.0290 ** 0.0763 ** 0.0095 ** 0.0116 ** 0.0082 ** -0.0059 0.0011 0.0071 ** 0.0235 0.0407 ** 0.0209 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level
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E.  RATING GROUPS 
Thus far PA has been determined across the 10 rating groups.  However, it is also 
appropriate to estimate the partial effect of the rating groups themselves relative to the 
baseline rating group, Group 6, Mechanical Equipment Repair - Aviation.  Table 14 
displays the partial effects of the rating group dummy variables themselves as determined 
from the pooled model (based on Table A-2).   
Of the nine rating groups, four were significant and positive and four were 
significant and negative.  The omitted rating group is Mechanical Equipment Repair - 
Aviation.  Only rating Group 9, Service Ratings, was not significant.  The rating groups 
with negative partial effects are the more technically oriented occupations indicating that 
the probability of affiliating with the SELRES decreases when a NAVET is trained in a 
technical skill.  These NAVETs have better opportunities for good civilian primary jobs 
and thus lower demand for part-time, moonlighting jobs. On the other hand, the four 
rating groups with significant and positive partial effects include Non-Rates and 
Seamanship ratings such as Boatswain's Mate.  For example, a NAVET in the 
Seamanship rating group has a probability of affiliating with the SELRES that is 3.15 
percentage points higher than a NAVET in the Mechanical Equipment Repair - Aviation 
rating group.  Likewise, a NAVET in a technical rating group such as Electronic 
Equipment repair has a 4.43 percentage point lower probability of affiliating than the 
Aviation Mechanic. 
Table 14. Partial Effects of Rating Groups on PA  
Source: Based on Table A-1 
 
Rating Groups Partial Effect
Group 1: Seamanship 0.0315 **
Group 2: Electronic Repair -0.0443 **
Group 3: Comms / Intel -0.0095 **
Group 4: Medical 0.0224 **
Group 5: Admin 0.0044 **
Group 6: Mechanical - Aviation Baseline
Group 7: Mechanical - Surface -0.0216 **
Group 8: Craftsman / Technical -0.0039 *
Group 9: Service -0.0026
Group 10: Non-Rates 0.0521 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level
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F.  DIFFERENCES IN AFFILIATION OVER TIME: THE DRAWDOWN 
YEARS 
The partial effect of each separation year dummy in the pooled model was highly 
significant in comparison to the baseline year of 1992.  While nine years had significant 
and positive coefficients, three years--1993, 1994, and 2002-- had negative coefficients.  
Rather than focus on these partial effects, this study looks at the possibility that the 
determinants of affiliation rates during the drawdown years of 1992 through 1994 
differed from the other years in the sample.  Three separate models were constructed to 
test this theory.  The unrestricted (pooled) model was based on the full sample and 
contained all variables found in the previous model with the exception of the separation 
year dummies.  Two restricted models were then constructed, one based on a sample of 
NAVETs who separated between 1992 and 1994, the other containing NAVETs from all 
separation years except 1992 to 1994.  The full logit model results are displayed in 
Appendix B.  A log likelihood ratio test conducted on the results indicated that the two 
time periods were in fact different and that pooling of the model is not acceptable.  Table 
15 depicts the partial effects from the two restricted models, while Table 16 depicts the 
Pay and Unemployment Rate elasticities from the models. 
The log likelihood ratio test rejected the hypothesis that the estimated parameters 
in the two models are the same and thus two separate models are required to properly 
describe the effect in the two periods.  Despite these differences however, there is mainly 
a difference in magnitude across the two models.  Although nine of the 32 explanatory 
variables differed in significance across the two models, 20 explanatory variables were 
significant in both models, all showing the same sign, indicating that it is only the 
magnitude, not significance, which differs.  Further, of these 20, 13 of the explanatory 
variables had a smaller effect in the 1992 to 1994 model than in the model containing 
observations from the non-drawdown years.   The years during the drawdown reduced the 
probability a NAVET would affiliate in the SELRES, when the sign was positive, and if 
the partial effects had a negative sign the drawdown years had a smaller effect on 
decreasing affiliation.  For example, a Black NAVET during the drawdown years has a 
2.1 percentage point increase in his probability of affiliating relative to a White NAVET, 
while in the years outside the drawdown there is a 2.7 percentage point increase in the 
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Table 15. Partial Effects of Separate Models for 1992-94 and Other Years 
Source: Based on Table B-1 
probability of a Black NAVET affiliating.  Where the partial effects are negative, such as 
marital status, an individual in the drawdown years is less likely to affiliate by almost 3.5 
percentage points, while in the years outside the drawdown there is an 7.5 percentage 
point decrease in a NAVET's probability of affiliation.  One possible explanation for this 
may be that NAVETs felt unwanted by the Navy as a whole during the drawdown and 
Sample = 1992-1994 Sample = 1990-1991
and 1995-2002
CONSTANT 0.1166 0.2984
RESPAY -0.00004 * -0.0001 **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0090 ** 0.0182 **
FEMALE 0.0110 ** 0.0103 **
MARRIED -0.0347 ** -0.0746 **
BLACK 0.0213 ** 0.0272 **
HISPANIC 0.0061 0.0463 **
OTHER RACE -0.0401 ** -0.0062
NON-HSGRAD -0.0023 -0.0134
GED -0.0099 -0.0281 **
CHILD 0.0003 -0.0097 *
CURRENT AGE -0.0028 ** -0.0064 **
AFQT 1 -0.0325 ** -0.0782 **
AFQT 3A 0.0140 ** -0.0027
AFQT 3B 0.0274 ** 0.0252 **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.0494 ** 0.0788 **
SEAMANSHIP 0.0484 ** 0.0926 **
ELECTRONIC REPAI -0.0561 ** -0.1563 **
COMMS / INTEL -0.0014 -0.0294 **
MEDICAL 0.0478 ** 0.0456 **
ADMIN / CLERICAL -0.0011 0.0229 **
MECH REP - SURF -0.0291 ** -0.0628 **
CRAFTSMAN / TECH 0.0006 -0.0104
SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0016 -0.0057
NON-RATES 0.0928 ** 0.0946 **
New England 0.0493 ** 0.0262 **
Middle Atlantic 0.0195 ** 0.0195 **
South Atlantic -0.0008 -0.0207 **
East South Central 0.0264 ** -0.0090
West North Central 0.0617 ** 0.0691 **
West South Central 0.0391 ** 0.0212 **
Mountain -0.0148 * -0.0261 **
Pacific -0.0818 ** -0.0757 **
Log Likelihood Ratio 71,295.16 188,520.15




thus they had less desire to affiliate with the SELRES.  Or, another possible explanation 
is that those NAVETs who opted for one of the separation bonuses being offered during 
this timeframe were unable to affiliate with the SELRES as a result of conditions placed 
upon the acceptance of the bonus.  
 
Table 16. Pay and Unemployment Elasticities for 1992-1994 and Other Years 
 
Source: Based on Table B-1 
 
The pay effect, which is inelastic in both models, does not appear to be a good 
indicator as it is significant and negative in both models.  A difference in magnitude does 
exist between the two models; however, it is unlikely that an increase in pay would 
decrease affiliation rates, and thus the outcome is suspect.  The unemployment rate 
elasticity is significant in both restricted models and falls in line with the results 
previously discussed.  It is inelastic overall, but the sign demonstrates that affiliation in 
the SELRES increases as the unemployment rate increases.  Again, there is a difference 
in magnitude between the two models, and it falls in line with the fact that the average 
annual unemployment rate during the drawdown years was higher than during the non-
drawdown years.  For each one percent increase in the unemployment rate, SELRES 
affiliation in the drawdown period increased by .52 percent as opposed to a .39 percent 
increase in the non-drawdown years.  
G. DIFFERENCES IN AFFILIATION OVER TIME: THE 'DOT-COM' 
BOOM 
The final hypothesis in this study is that the probability of affiliation with the 
SELRES differed during the technical employment (dot-com) boom of the late 1990s and 
the years at the beginning of the millennium when the boom turned to a bust.  To see if 
Pay Unemployment
Rate
Separation Years 1992-1994 -0.41 * 0.52 **
Separation Years 1990-1991 and 1995-2002 -0.69 ** 0.39 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
* significant at the 5-percent confidence level
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there was a difference, two time periods were chosen, 1997 to 1999, which represent the 
tech boom years, and 2000 to 2002, which represent the tech bust years.  Using the same 
procedure described above, separate models were estimated for each period and a log 
likelihood ratio test was run on the models to test the hypothesis that their betas were the 
same.  The results concluded that the two periods were different, and thus different 
models were required to determine the effects.  Table 17 displays the partial effects of the 
two models (Appendix C displays complete logit results). 
Table 17. Partial Effects of Separate Models for 1997-1999 and 2000-2002 
Source: Based on Table C-1 
Sample = 1997-1999 Sample = 2000-2002
CONSTANT 0.0096 0.1122
RESPAY 0.00002 ** 0.000005
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0022 ** -0.0087 **
FEMALE 0.0025 ** 0.0267 **
MARRIED -0.0027 ** -0.0276 **
BLACK 0.0028 ** 0.0146 **
HISPANIC 0.0041 ** 0.0332 **




CURRENT AGE -0.0001 ** 0.0012 *
AFQT 1 -0.0050 ** -0.0308 **
AFQT 3A -0.0003 -0.0156 **
AFQT 3B 0.0016 ** -0.0133 **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.0128 ** -0.0706
SEAMANSHIP 0.0041 ** 0.0270 **
ELECTRONIC REPAIR -0.0069 ** -0.0709 **
COMMS / INTEL -0.0027 ** -0.0067
MEDICAL -0.0022 ** 0.0404 **
ADMIN / CLERICAL 0.0005 0.0023
MECH REP - SURF -0.0022 ** -0.0045
CRAFTSMAN / TECH -0.0014 * -0.0003
SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0006 0.0059
NON-RATES 0.0046 ** 0.0295 **
New England -0.00002 -0.0300 **
Middle Atlantic -0.0018 ** -0.0085
South Atlantic -0.0009 ** -0.0230 **
East South Central -0.0012 * -0.0100
West North Central 0.0038 ** -0.0005
West South Central -0.0004 0.0028
Mountain -0.0018 ** -0.0067
Pacific -0.0017 ** -0.0038
Log Likelihood Ratio 51,376.56 39,112.59




The partial effects of the two models indicate that the coefficients, overall, differ 
in both significance and magnitude.  Of the 15 explanatory variables that are significant 
in both models, 11 have the same sign and in each case the coefficients from the 1997-
1999 sample are smaller in magnitude than for the 2000-2002 sample.  In addition, nine 
explanatory variables are significant in the 1997-1999 sample but not in the 2000-2002 
sample.  Given that the two samples have roughly the same number of observations this 
would lead us to believe that the ability to predict the probability of affiliation during 
boom years is better than in the uncertainty of the bust years. 
Table 18 displays the pay and unemployment elasticities associated with these 
two periods. 
Table 18. Pay and Unemployment Elasticities for Boom and Bust Years 
Source: Based on Table C-1 
To reinforce what can be determined from the estimated partial effects of the 1997-1999 
boom period, significant and positive elasticities exist for both pay and unemployment 
during this period.  Pay is highly elastic, an expected result of the tech boom, while the 
unemployment elasticity is the highest seen over all of the years included in the sample.  
As for the bust period of 2000-2002, pay is not significant, while unemployment is oddly 
significant and negative.  This is a surprising result because one would expect that during 
a bust, when the unemployment rate increases, affiliation also would increase.  However, 
based upon this result a one percent increase in the unemployment rate would result in a 
.40 percent decrease in the affiliation rate.  It is recommended that this last finding be 
tested again once more data becomes available from the bust period.  The 'dot-com' bust 
did not start until mid-2000, so only a little over one year of affiliation data is included in 
our sample.  Analysis of a more extensive data set with more affiliation decisions may 
reveal a different pattern of relationships. 
Pay Unemployment Rate
Separation Years 1997-1999 ('Boom') 1.90 ** 0.85 **
Separation Years 2000-2002 ('Bust') 0.05 -0.40 **
** significant at the 1-percent confidence level
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V. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study was conducted to determine if changes in the factors that affect the 
affiliation of naval veterans in the SELRES have changed since the study conducted by 
Shiells (1986) in the early 1980s.  The major findings in this study are described below. 
SELRES affiliation continues to be an economic decision.  The theory of the 
decision to work and the concept of moonlighting are still sound theories that apply to 
SELRES affiliation.  Overall, reserve pay has a significant and positive effect on NAVET 
decisions to affiliate with the SELRES. However, although pay was statistically 
significant in six out of 10 rating groups, its effect was smaller than estimated in the 
earlier study of the early 1980s (Shiells, 1986). 
As expected, the unemployment rate had a significant and positive effect on 
NAVET affiliation in the SELRES.  The higher the unemployment rate the greater the 
probability of NAVET affiliation with the SELRES.  Although unemployment rate 
elasticities proved to be inelastic across all rating groups, the significant and positive 
trend toward affiliation was consistent with the early 1980s study. 
NAVET affiliation rates varied across Census regions.  Because pay and 
unemployment rate were taken into account in the models, the variation across regions is 
likely attributable to economic factors such as cost of living, or non-pecuniary factors, 
such as patriotism.  Note, too, that affiliation rates will vary across regions due to the 
location of Reserve Centers and units. 
Demographic indicators such as gender, race, marital status, dependents, and age 
are significant predictors of NAVET affiliation.  Female NAVETs have a higher 
probability of affiliation in the SELRES then males.  Blacks and Hispanics have a higher 
probability of affiliation then Whites.  Married NAVETS have a lower probability of 
affiliation then single NAVETs.  NAVETs with children have a lower probability of 
affiliation then NAVETs with no children, and finally, the older a NAVET, the less likely 
they are to affiliate. 
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In concurrence with previous research, high school graduates have a significantly 
higher probability of affiliation then non-high school graduates or GED holders.  This is 
likely due to requirements that applicants be high school diploma graduates.  On the other 
hand, lower mental (test score) categories have a higher probability of affiliation than 
higher mental categories, more than likely due to the better civilian job prospects of the 
higher mental groups.   
The probability of NAVET affiliation in the SELRES is significantly different 
across rating groups.  Technically skilled ratings tend have a lower probability of 
affiliation than groups with less technically skilled ratings.  This is understandable 
because NAVETs in technical ratings have better job opportunities in the civilian sector.  
However, the different affiliation rates also likely reflect differences in demand for 
accessions into different ratings, as well as supply decisions 
Policy decisions established by the active duty Navy affect the probability of 
affiliation of NAVETs in the SELRES.  The magnitude of the determinants of the 
probability of affiliation during the drawdown years of 1992 to 1994 were significantly 
different than during the non-drawdown years.  For example, the effect of pay on 
affiliation was smaller during the drawdown period.  In addition, the determinants of 
affiliation rates during the 'dot-com' boom of the late 1990s proved to be significantly 
different from those during the 'dot-com' bust at the turn of the century.  Of particular 
note was how elastic pay was during the tech boom, with a highly positive effect on 
affiliation. 
An interesting sidenote discovered during the course of the study is that average 
military pay has remained fairly constant over the past two decades.  In real 1978 dollars, 
current pay averaged $1,103 across the data in this study, while it averaged $1,136, in 
real 1978 dollars, in Shiells (1986).  An average net loss of $33 over two decades.  This 
indicates that base pay increases across this period were in line with inflation.  Therefore, 
it is expected that the same economic factors determined to be significant by Shiells 




There are two unique features of this study that limited the research.  The first is 
that the data set used had no information on which NAVETs were offered bonuses to 
affiliate.  Thus, the pay variable did not include the effect of bonuses on affiliation 
decisions, nor were we able to include bonuses as an explanatory variable in the model.  
This limitation potentially reduces the estimated pay effect on affiliation. 
Secondly, Enlisted Career Management Objectives (ECMO) categories were not 
used as a demand side constraint.  The tracking of ever-changing ECMO categories 
across the period involved, the tracking of the number of NAVETs that used the 
RESCORE-R program to change ratings in order to affiliate in the SELRES, and the 
tracking of the number of NAVETs who affiliated in the SELRES under rating waivers, 
were beyond the scope of this study. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first recommendation stems directly from the limitations just discussed.  The 
inclusion of SELRES bonus information and the exclusion of NAVETs in overmanned 
ECMO categories should be accounted for in future research to provide a more robust 
data set from which to model. 
The idea that active duty Navy policy decisions have a direct effect on NAVET 
affiliation in the SELRES is something that requires further study.  As the Navy 
continues to integrate and maneuver within the Total Force environment it is vital that 
policy decisions are made with the knowledge that they may affect NAVET affiliation 
decisions.  To fully understand this concept it is recommended that this study be repeated 
once quality data becomes available to assess the impact of operational and personnel 
tempo on NAVET affiliation decisions in the post-9/11 Navy.  Although this study found 
significant differences between the drawdown years and non-drawdown years, as well as 
during the boom and bust years associated with the tech industry, there was insufficient 
data to study any potential 9/11 effects.  However, based on the findings in this study it 
can be theorized that there will be significant differences in post-9/11 NAVET affiliation 
decisions due to changes in the Navy's tempo policies, and the increased possibility that a 
SELRES will be mobilized. 
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Finally, because this study confirmed that NAVET affiliation in the SELRES is, 
in fact, an economic decision, it is recommended that bonuses be applied to ratings that 
prove to have higher pay elasticities.  Using the pay elasticities determined in this study, 
the Navy Recruiting Command could target bonuses and incentives toward specific skill 
sets in order to maximize the Navy's return-on-investment while at the same time meeting 





APPENDIX A. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOGIT 
COEFFICIENTS AND PARTIAL EFFECTS FOR POOLED MODEL 
AND INDIVIDUAL RATING MODELS 
Table A-1. Maximum Likelihood Logit Coefficient Estimates for Separate Rating 
Groups 
Group Pooled Seaman Elect Eq Comms/ Medical
Ratings Repair Intel
INTERCEPT -2.4700 0.2031 -5.1843 -3.8370 -4.2779
(0.1089) ** (0.3962) (.0.0154) ** (0.3023) ** (0.3644) **
RESPAY 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0017 0.0024
(0.0001) ** (0.0003) (0.0004) ** (0.0002) ** (0.0003) **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.1025 0.0465 0.0520 0.0472 0.0806
(0.005) ** (0.0168) ** (0.0281) (0.0144) ** (0.0178) **
FEMALE 0.0757 -0.0177 -0.0569 -0.0857 -0.0480
(0.0156) ** (0.0765) (0.1108) (0.0419) * (0.0458)
MARRIED -0.4064 -0.4243 -0.6136 -0.4406 -0.4411
(0.0138) ** (0.0491) ** (0.0737) ** (0.0381) ** (0.0452) **
BLACK 0.1632 -0.0365 0.0366 0.1467 -0.0745
(0.0141) ** (0.0504) (0.096) (0.0371) ** (0.0554)
HISPANIC 0.1912 0.0452 0.1375 0.2213 -0.0192
(0.0177) ** (0.0628) (0.1058) (0.0516) ** (0.0634)
OTHER RACE -0.0813 -0.1732 -0.1152 0.0629 -0.3832
(0.0270) ** (0.1101) (0.1715) (0.0921) (0.0873) **
NON-HSGRAD -0.0809 -0.0502 0.7641 -0.0924 0.1253
(0.0365) * (0.101) (0.1707) ** (0.0957) (0.1476)
GED -0.1026 -0.1259 -0.0927 -0.0694 0.0147
(0.0294) ** (0.0969) ((0.1603) (0.0834) (0.1166)
CHILD -0.0480 0.0614 -0.3823 -0.0981 -0.0192
(0.0191) * (0.66) (0.1173) ** (0.0558) (0.0643)
CURRENT AGE -0.0323 -0.0768 0.0091 -0.0225 -0.0317
(0.002) ** (0.0089) ** (0.0113) (0.0064) ** (0.0072) **
AFQT 1 -0.3862 -0.0990 -0.3253 -0.1692 -0.1427
(0.0360) ** (0.1197) (0.1068) ** (0.0855) * (0.1202)
AFQT 3A 0.0625 -0.0679 0.5207 0.1199 0.1056
(0.0148) ** (0.0516) (0.0777) ** (0.0374) ** (0.0490) *
AFQT 3B 0.1878 0.1628 0.9283 0.3015 0.2123
(0.0139) ** (0.0466) ** (0.097) ** (0.0391) ** (0.0546) **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.3484 0.3157 1.0045 0.4484 0.4782
(0.0244) ** (0.0693) ** (0.3181) ** (0.0844) ** (0.1655) **
NORTHEAST 0.2146 0.0572 0.1199 0.1764 0.0741
(0.0316) ** (0.1071) (0.1644) (0.0885) * (0.1314)
MID-ATLANTIC 0.1253 0.1326 -0.0600 0.0844 0.0872
(0.0174) ** (0.0579) * (0.1010) (0.0472) (0.0664)
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.0521 -0.1309 -0.0940 -0.1118 -0.0072
(0.0159) ** (0.0543) * (0.0869) (0.0420) ** (0.0585)
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.0576 0.1098 -0.0907 -0.0506 0.1502
(0.0248) * (0.082) (0.1437) (0.0676) (0.0939)
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 0.4054 0.4172 0.4777 0.3343 0.4182
(0.0218) ** (0.0713) ** (0.1103) ** (0.0607) ** (0.0857) **
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.1851 0.2898 0.1805 0.1516 0.2613
(0.0169) ** (0.0575) ** (0.0936) (0.0460) ** (0.0607) **
MOUNTAIN -0.0781 -0.1024 -0.0704 -0.1761 0.1205
(0.0297) ** (0.1014) (0.1522) (0.0860) * (0.1003)
PACIFIC -0.4007 -0.6879 -0.0297 -0.4839 -0.1745
(0.0268) ** (0.1046) ** (0.1249) (0.793) ** (0.0864) *
Log likelihood ratio 259,173.54 21,002.91 10,533.52 35,955.73 18,660.13
Chi-Square 11,970.20 ** 771.43 ** 514.09 ** 950.46 ** 642.63 **
Observations 386,119 24,518 30,877 57,279 24,819
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Table A-1. (continued) 
 
Group Admin/ Mech Eq Mech Eq Craftsman/ Service/ Non-
Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply Rates
INTERCEPT -1.2822 -0.6001 -5.4015 -1.6135 -1.6294 -1.9556
(0.3162) ** (0.2415) * (0.3093) ** (0.4481) ** (0.4394) ** (0.6534) **
RESPAY -0.0006 -0.0020 0.0014 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0008
(0.00025) * (0.00019) ** (0.0002) ** (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.00068)
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0620 0.1334 0.1246 0.1062 0.1445 0.1562
(0.0160) ** (0.0110) ** (0.0141) ** (0.0232) ** (0.0207) ** (0.0129) **
FEMALE 0.3493 0.1348 0.2565 0.0108 0.0814 -0.0571
(0.0367) ** (0.0447) ** (0.0534) ** (0.0773) (0.0674) (0.0379)
MARRIED -0.4585 -0.3621 -0.3360 -0.3638 -0.3792 -0.3869
(0.0412) ** (0.0323) ** (0.0380) ** (0.0600) ** (0.0609) ** (0.0387) **
BLACK 0.1104 0.1769 0.2910 -0.0934 0.1729 0.3381
(0.0415) ** (0.0388) ** (0.0396) ** (0.0851) (0.0537) ** (0.0321) **
HISPANIC 0.2120 0.2687 0.3286 0.0667 0.1033 0.1731
(0.0546) ** (0.0399) ** (0.0469) ** (0.0897) (0.0833) (0.0438) **
OTHER RACE -0.1717 -0.0357 0.1412 -0.0160 -0.3461 -0.0028
(0.0790) * (0.0639) (0.0624) * (0.1394) (0.1116) ** (0.0710)
NON-HSGRAD -0.2902 -0.2509 0.2255 -0.1485 -0.1987 -0.3272
(0.1280) * (0.0832) ** (0.1040) * (0.1497) (0.1813) (0.1080) **
GED -0.2738 -0.0490 -0.0035 -0.1927 -0.1912 -0.1949
(0.1029) ** (0.0635) (0.0790) (0.1237) (0.1446) (0.0757) *
CHILD 0.0074 -0.0236 -0.1081 -0.1906 -0.1088 0.0885
(0.0560) (0.0449) (0.0523) * (0.0837) * (0.0799) (0.0528)
CURRENT AGE -0.0279 -0.0302 -0.0101 -0.0602 -0.0432 -0.0642
(0.0059) ** (0.00549) ** (0.0061) (0.00986) ** (0.00928) ** (0.0065) **
AFQT 1 0.0290 -0.1146 -1.0373 -0.3962 -0.5674 -0.4063
(0.1031) (0.0926) (0.1039) ** (0.2052) (0.3518) (0.1451) **
AFQT 3A -0.0305 -0.0794 0.4821 0.0423 -0.0641 -0.1524
(0.0433) (0.0345) * (0.0443) ** (0.0640) (0.0785) (0.0427) **
AFQT 3B 0.0101 -0.0374 0.6379 0.0367 0.0709 0.0652
(0.0436) (0.0327) (0.0389) ** (0.0626) (0.0684) (0.0353)
AFQT 4A or 5 -0.0352 0.0050 0.9554 0.1610 0.2719 0.1802
0998 (0.0675) (0.0606) ** (0.1131) (0.0966) ** (0.0549) **
NORTHEAST 0.1932 0.1736 0.4139 0.0754 0.0741 0.3432
(0.1077) (0.0788) * (0.0810) ** (0.1243) (0.1301) (0.0797) **
MID-ATLANTIC 0.1084 0.0878 0.2180 0.1617 0.0349 0.1606
(0.0557) (0.0431) * (0.0479) ** (0.0751) * (0.0727) (0.0431) **
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.0007 -0.0427 -0.0723 -0.0675 -0.0835 0.0024
(0.0490) (0.0390) (0.0461) (0.0760) (0.0697) (0.0390)
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.1503 -0.0355 0.1033 0.0335 0.1301 0.0912
(0.0752) * (0.0630) (0.0691) (0.1242) (0.0976) (0.0617)
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 0.3990 0.3418 0.4137 0.3105 0.5338 0.4986
(0.0688) ** (0.0512) ** (0.0618) ** (0.0931) ** (0.1004) ** (0.0561) **
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.1471 0.1908 0.1380 0.1080 0.1520 0.2492
(0.0521) ** (0.0400) ** (0.0481) ** (0.0832) (0.0749) * (0.0425) **
MOUNTAIN -0.0596 -0.0984 -0.0798 -0.0741 -0.1420 -0.1277
(0.0981) (0.0662) (0.0785) (0.1204) (0.1480) (0.0843)
PACIFIC -0.4652 -0.4562 -0.2555 -0.5927 -0.4335 -0.5656
(0.0886) ** (0.0600) ** (0.0655) ** (0.1179) ** (0.1271) ** (0.0832) **
Log likelihood ratio 26,316.51 44,932.78 35,672.02 12,883.94 13,797.15 36,751.05
Chi-Square 906.82 ** 1,346.41 1,611.62 ** 428.06 ** 466.38 ** 1,378.71 **
Observations 37,421 66,663 65,771 20,258 20,042 38,471
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Table A-2. Partial Effects for Pooled Model and all Individual Rating Group Models 
 
Pooled Seaman Elect Eq Comms/ Medical
Ratings Repair Intel
CONSTANT 0.0780 0.5506 0.0056 0.0211 0.0137
RESPAY 0.00002 ** -0.0001 0.00001 ** 0.00004 ** 0.00003 **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0077 ** 0.0115 ** 0.0003 0.0010 ** 0.0011 **
FEMALE 0.0056 ** -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0017 * -0.0006
MARRIED -0.0246 ** -0.1057 ** -0.0025 ** -0.0074 ** -0.0048 **
BLACK 0.0126 ** -0.0090 0.0002 0.0033 ** -0.0010
HISPANIC 0.0149 ** 0.0112 0.0008 0.0051 ** -0.0003
OTHER RACE -0.0056 ** -0.0431 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.0043 **
NON-HSGRAD -0.0056 * -0.0125 0.0063 ** -0.0018 0.0018
GED -0.0071 ** -0.0313 -0.0005 -0.0014 0.0002
CHILD -0.0034 * 0.0151 -0.0018 ** -0.0019 -0.0003
CURRENT AGE -0.0023 ** -0.0191 ** 0.0001 -0.0005 ** -0.0004 **
AFQT 1 -0.0236 ** -0.0246 -0.0015 ** -0.0032 * -0.0018
AFQT 3A 0.0046 ** -0.0169 0.0038 ** 0.0026 ** 0.0015 *
AFQT 3B 0.0146 ** 0.0399 ** 0.0084 ** 0.0072 ** 0.0032 **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.0290 ** 0.0763 ** 0.0095 ** 0.0116 ** 0.0082 **
SEAMANSHIP 0.0315 ** - - - -
ELECTRONIC REPAIR -0.0443 ** - - - -
COMMS / INTEL -0.0095 ** - - - -
MEDICAL 0.0224 ** - - - -
ADMIN / CLERICAL 0.0044 ** - - - -
MECH REP - SURF -0.0216 ** - - - -
CRAFTSMAN / TECH -0.0039 * - - - -
SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0026 - - - -
NON-RATES 0.0521 ** - - - -
SEP_FY_90 0.0565 ** 0.1517 ** 0.0068 ** 0.0083 ** 0.0110 **
SEP_FY_91 0.0298 ** 0.1032 ** 0.0039 ** 0.0010 0.0056 **
SEP_FY_93 -0.0219 ** -0.1019 ** -0.0011 * -0.0093 ** -0.0058 **
SEP_FY_94 -0.0075 ** -0.0280 -0.0004 -0.0082 ** 0.0031 *
SEP_FY_95 0.0189 ** 0.0644 ** 0.0008 -0.0022 0.0070 **
SEP_FY_96 0.0315 ** 0.0721 ** 0.0016 0.0000 0.0053 **
SEP_FY_97 0.0512 ** 0.1342 ** 0.0008 0.0030 0.0094 **
SEP_FY_98 0.0449 ** 0.1158 ** 0.0033 ** 0.0002 -0.0045 **
SEP_FY_99 0.0474 ** 0.1244 ** 0.0006 0.0067 ** -0.0081 **
SEP_FY_00 0.0495 ** 0.0403 -0.0003 0.0039 0.0106 **
SEP_FY_01 0.0152 ** 0.0035 -0.0010 -0.0039 * 0.0000
SEP_FY_02 -0.0086 ** -0.0387 -0.0010 -0.0103 ** -0.0046 **
New England 0.0169 ** 0.0141 0.0007 0.0040 * 0.0010
Middle Atlantic 0.0095 ** 0.0325 * -0.0003 0.0018 0.0012
South Atlantic -0.0037 ** -0.0326 * -0.0005 -0.0022 ** -0.0001
East South Central 0.0042 * 0.0270 -0.0005 -0.0010 0.0022
West North Central 0.0346 ** 0.0997 ** 0.0034 ** 0.0081 ** 0.0070 **
West South Central 0.0144 ** 0.0702 ** 0.0011 0.0034 ** 0.0040 **
Mountain -0.0054 ** -0.0254 -0.0004 -0.0033 * 0.0017
Pacific -0.0244 ** -0.1695 ** -0.0002 -0.0080 ** -0.0022 *
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Table A-2. (continued) 
Group Admin/ Mech Eq Mech Eq Craftsman/ Service/ Non-
Clerical Rep -Av Rep-Surf Technical Supply Rates
CONSTANT 0.2172 0.3543 0.0045 0.1661 0.1639 0.1239
RESPAY -0.0001 * -0.0004 ** 0.00001 ** 0.00004 -0.0001 0.0001
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0107 ** 0.0311 ** 0.0006 ** 0.0152 ** 0.0208 ** 0.0180 **
FEMALE 0.0652 ** 0.0314 ** 0.0013 ** 0.0015 0.0115 -0.0061
MARRIED -0.0680 ** -0.0779 ** -0.0013 ** -0.0445 ** -0.0456 ** -0.0363 **
BLACK 0.0194 ** 0.0414 ** 0.0015 ** -0.0125 0.0251 ** 0.0416 **
HISPANIC 0.0382 ** 0.0636 ** 0.0017 ** 0.0094 0.0147 0.0201 **
OTHER RACE -0.0278 * -0.0081 0.0007 * -0.0022 -0.0421 ** -0.0003
NON-HSGRAD -0.0453 * -0.0551 ** 0.0011 * -0.0196 -0.0254 -0.0314 **
GED -0.0430 ** -0.0111 -0.00002 -0.0250 -0.0246 -0.0197 **
CHILD 0.0013 -0.0054 -0.0005 * -0.0248 * -0.0144 0.0099
CURRENT AGE -0.0047 ** -0.0069 ** -0.00004 -0.0082 ** -0.0058 ** -0.0068 **
AFQT 1 0.0050 -0.0258 -0.0029 ** -0.0479 -0.0639 -0.0378 **
AFQT 3A -0.0051 -0.0179 * 0.0028 ** 0.0059 -0.0086 -0.0156 **
AFQT 3B 0.0017 -0.0085 0.0040 ** 0.0051 0.0099 0.0073
AFQT 4A or 5 -0.0059 0.0011 0.0071 ** 0.0235 0.0407 ** 0.0209 **
SEAMANSHIP - - - - - -
ELECTRONIC REPAIR - - - - - -
COMMS / INTEL - - - - - -
MEDICAL - - - - - -
ADMIN / CLERICAL - - - - - -
MECH REP - SURF - - - - - -
CRAFTSMAN / TECH - - - - - -
SERVICE / SUPPLY - - - - - -
NON-RATES - - - - - -
SEP_FY_90 0.0987 ** 0.1691 ** 0.0042 ** 0.0553 ** 0.0677 ** 0.1343 **
SEP_FY_91 0.0848 ** 0.1145 ** 0.0014 ** 0.0554 ** 0.0855 ** 0.0541 **
SEP_FY_93 -0.0653 ** -0.0867 ** 0.0000 -0.0726 ** -0.0530 ** -0.0237 **
SEP_FY_94 -0.0620 ** -0.0480 ** 0.0012 ** -0.0561 ** -0.0192 0.0037
SEP_FY_95 0.0365 * 0.0350 * 0.0045 ** 0.0093 0.0153 0.0228 **
SEP_FY_96 0.0789 ** 0.1433 ** 0.0079 ** 0.0044 0.0957 ** 0.0054
SEP_FY_97 0.1261 ** 0.1768 ** 0.0104 ** 0.0314 0.1203 ** 0.0467 **
SEP_FY_98 0.0779 ** 0.1857 ** 0.0100 ** 0.0563 * 0.1210 ** 0.0608 **
SEP_FY_99 0.1381 ** 0.1889 ** 0.0092 ** 0.0948 ** 0.1068 ** 0.0190
SEP_FY_00 0.0883 ** 0.1534 ** 0.0107 ** 0.0827 ** 0.1040 ** 0.0122
SEP_FY_01 0.0052 0.1168 ** 0.0042 ** 0.0018 0.0690 ** -0.0047
SEP_FY_02 -0.0234 0.0387 * 0.0024 ** -0.0585 ** 0.0047 -0.0545 **
New England 0.0346 0.0406 * 0.0023 ** 0.0107 0.0104 0.0423 **
Middle Atlantic 0.0190 0.0203 * 0.0011 ** 0.0236 * 0.0048 0.0185 **
South Atlantic -0.0001 -0.0097 -0.0003 -0.0091 -0.0111 0.0003
East South Central 0.0266 * -0.0081 0.0005 0.0047 0.0186 0.0102
West North Central 0.0753 ** 0.0815 ** 0.0023 ** 0.0476 ** 0.0867 ** 0.0650 **
West South Central 0.0260 ** 0.0448 ** 0.0007 ** 0.0155 0.0219 * 0.0297 **
Mountain -0.0100 -0.0222 -0.0003 -0.0100 -0.0185 -0.0132
Pacific -0.0688 ** -0.0963 ** -0.0010 ** -0.0669 ** -0.0512 ** -0.0496 **
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APPENDIX B. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOGIT 
COEFFICIENTS FOR YEARS 1992 - 1994, AND FOR ALL OTHER 
YEARS IN THE SAMPLE 
Table B-1. Maximum Likelihood Logit Coefficient Estimates for 1992-1994 Sample, 




Group 1992-1994 Sample 1990-1991 and Pooled Sample
1995-2002 Sample
INTERCEPT -2.0254 -0.8550 -1.0893
(0.2092) ** (0.1080) ** (0.0961) **
RESPAY -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.00017) * (0.00008) ** (0.00007) **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.0847 0.0857 0.0012
(0.0085) ** (0.0049) ** (0.0039)
FEMALE 0.1025 0.0487 0.0605
(0.0314) ** (0.0179) ** (0.0155) **
MARRIED -0.3924 -0.3889 -0.3770
(0.0282) ** (0.0157) ** (0.0137) **
BLACK 0.1920 0.1268 0.1537
(0.0258) ** (0.0166) ** (0.0139) **
HISPANIC 0.0582 0.2126 0.2140
(0.0360) (0.0200) ** (0.0174) **
OTHER RACE -0.4663 -0.0300 -0.0955
(0.0671) ** (0.0295) (0.0268) **
NON-HSGRAD -0.0228 -0.0650 -0.0855
(0.0614) (0.0450) (0.0361) *
GED -0.1003 -0.1380 -0.1309
(0.0574) (0.0341) ** (0.0292) **
CHILD 0.0027 -0.0470 -0.0522
(0.0364) (0.0224) * (0.0190) **
CURRENT AGE -0.0274 -0.0307 -0.0290
(0.0044) ** (0.0025) ** (0.0022) **
AFQT 1 -0.3624 -0.4096 -0.4050
(0.0773) ** (0.0405) ** (0.0358) **
AFQT 3A 0.1291 -0.0128 0.0097
(0.0295) ** (0.0166) (0.0143)
AFQT 3B 0.2426 0.1176 0.1347
(0.0296) ** (0.0154) ** (0.0133) **
AFQT 4A or 5 0.4109 0.3536 0.3057
(0.0392) ** (0.0309) ** (0.0236) **
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Table B-1. (continued) 
 
 
Group 1992-1994 Sample 1990-1991 and Pooled Sample
1995-2002 Sample
SEAMANSHIP 0.4034 0.4118 0.4019
(0.0441) ** (0.0248) ** (0.0215) **
ELECTRONIC EQUIP -0.7186 -0.9427 -0.9004
(0.0682) ** (0.0350) ** (0.0311) **
COMMS / INTEL -0.0134 -0.1446 -0.1334
(0.0389) (0.0220) ** (0.0191) **
MEDICAL 0.3992 0.2093 0.2505
(0.0454) ** (0.0268) ** (0.0230) **
ADMIN / CLERICAL -0.0109 0.1072 0.0724
(0.0444) (0.0234) ** (0.0206) **
EQUIP REP SURFACE -0.3191 -0.3219 -0.3303
(0.0399) ** (0.0218) ** (0.0190) **
CRAFTSMAN / TECH 0.0058 -0.0502 -0.0642
(0.0523) (0.0310) (0.0266)
SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0157 -0.0272 -0.0382
(0.0499) (0.0304) (0.0258)
NON-RATES 0.6968 0.4203 0.5060
(0.0379) ** (0.0239) ** (0.0200) **
NORTHEAST 0.4104 0.1221 0.2010
(0.0624) ** (0.0366) ** (0.0315) **
MID-ATLANTIC 0.1769 0.0913 0.1517
(0.0337) ** (0.0203) ** (0.0173) **
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.0080 -0.1009 -0.0984
(0.0303) (0.0186) ** (0.0158) **
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.2348 -0.0435 0.0477
(0.0455) ** (0.0295) (0.0247)
WEST NORTH CENTRAL 0.4975 0.3119 0.2505
(0.0422) ** (0.0251) ** (0.0213) **
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 0.3348 0.0995 0.1869
(0.0317) ** (0.0197) ** (0.0167) **
MOUNTAIN -0.1521 -0.1279 -0.1334
(0.0655) * (0.0332) ** (0.0294) **
PACIFIC -1.2975 -0.3952 -0.4147
(0.0941) ** (0.0281) ** (0.0263) **
Log likelihood ratio 71,295.16 188,520.15 262,006.49
Chi-Square 3,519.80 ** 7,077.42 ** 9,137.25 **
Observations 121,554 264,565 386,119
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APPENDIX C. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOGIT 
COEFFICIENTS FOR 'DOT-COM' BOOM YEARS 1997 - 1999 AND 
FOR 'DOT-COM' BUST YEARS 2000 - 2002 
Table C-1. Maximum Likelihood Logit Coefficient Estimates for 'Dot-Com'  
Boom and Bust Years 
 
 
Group Boom Years Bust Years Pooled Years
1997-1999 2000-2002 1997-2002
INTERCEPT -4.6315 -2.0682 -1.3922
(0.2527) ** (0.2404) ** (0.1432) **
RESPAY 0.0020 0.0000 -0.0008
(0.0002) ** (0.00019) (0.0001) **
UNEMPLOY RATE 0.2102 -0.0902 0.0946
(0.0116) ** (0.0166) ** (0.0093) **
FEMALE 0.2334 0.2442 0.1706
(0.0330) ** (0.0366) ** (0.0238) **
MARRIED -0.3294 -0.3134 -0.2865
(0.0296) ** (0.0341) ** (0.0222) **
BLACK 0.2575 0.1392 0.1593
(0.0319) ** (0.0384) ** (0.0242) **
HISPANIC 0.3580 0.2974 0.3436
(0.0362) ** (0.0416) ** (0.0268) **
OTHER RACE 0.1837 0.0856 0.1239
(0.0527) ** (0.0511) (0.0363) **
NON-HSGRAD -0.0662 0.1946 -0.0030
(0.1179) (0.1120) (0.0810)
GED -0.0213 -0.0376 -0.1129 *
(0.0636) (0.0617) (0.0440)
CHILD -0.0051 -0.1504 0.0514
(0.0392) (0.0816) (0.0337)
CURRENT AGE -0.0151 0.0120 0.0004
(0.0049) ** (0.0051) * (0.0035)
AFQT 1 -0.7293 -0.3555 -0.5633
(0.0824) ** (0.1996) ** (0.0631) **
AFQT 3A -0.0286 -0.1676 -0.1019
(0.0321) (0.0395) ** (0.0242) **
AFQT 3B 0.1547 -0.1408 0.0057
(0.0298) ** (0.0366) ** (0.0221)
AFQT 4A or 5 0.8587 -1.0687 0.5989
(0.1801) ** (0.7228) (0.1674) **
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Group Boom Years Bust Years Pooled Years
1997-1999 2000-2002 1997-2002
SEAMANSHIP 0.3556 0.2464 0.3730
(0.0475) ** (0.0623) ** (0.0373) **
ELECTRONIC EQUIP -1.2673 -1.0764 -1.1690
(0.0798) ** (0.0654) ** (0.0501) **
COMMS / INTEL -0.3343 -0.0690 -0.1605
(0.0425) ** (0.0454) (0.0308) **
MEDICAL -0.2594 0.3538 0.0358
(0.0599) ** (0.0532) ** (0.0391)
ADMIN / CLERICAL 0.0528 0.0230 0.0835
(0.0426) (0.0542) (0.0331) *
EQUIP REP SURFACE -0.2585 -0.0458 -0.1390
(0.0411) ** (0.0450) (0.0302) **
CRAFTSMAN / TECH -0.1582 -0.0035 -0.0816
(0.0636) (0.0676) (0.0461)
SERVICE / SUPPLY -0.0597 0.0579 -0.0149
(0.0580) (0.0713) (0.0447)
NON-RATES 0.3960 0.2675 0.3123
(0.0433) ** (0.0879) ** (0.0354) **
NORTHEAST -0.0023 -0.3449 -0.1638
(0.0743) (0.0944) ** (0.0576) **
MID-ATLANTIC -0.2126 -0.0888 -0.1982
(0.0415) ** (0.0544) (0.0319) **
SOUTH ATLANTIC -0.0978 -0.2546 -0.1998
(0.0335) ** (0.0506) ** (0.0273) **
EAST SOUTH CENTR -0.1292 -0.1047 -0.2053
(0.0601) * (0.0700) (0.0445) **
WEST NORTH CENTR 0.3344 -0.0046 0.1271
(0.0500) ** (0.0659) (0.0390) **
WEST SOUTH CENTR -0.0387 0.0275 -0.0724
(0.0358) (0.0514) (0.0286) *
MOUNTAIN -0.2064 -0.0688 -0.1988
(0.0695) ** (0.0622) (0.0436) **
PACIFIC -0.1895 -0.0387 -0.3516
(0.0634) ** (0.0519) (0.0344) **
Log likelihood ratio 51,376.56 39,112.59 91,425.00
Chi-Square 2,048.37 ** 938.99 ** 2,787.64 **
Observations 67,848 67,377 135,225
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